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Abstract  
Several studies have examined gasoline and diesel demand elasticities. These studies usually cover a 
single country or a group of countries that belong to a specific economic alliance such as the OECD. Even 
though consistent elasticities are necessary to analyze and forecast the effects of EU-level fuel policy, 
there has not yet been a study that provides consistent gasoline and diesel demand elasticity across the 
EU-28. This study set out to address this literature gap by estimating price and income elasticities for 
gasoline and diesel. For this purpose, an ARDL Bounds testing approach is used to test the existence of a 
long-run relationship and estimate the elasticities. The estimation provides short and long-run price and 
income elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand for the EU-28 countries and shows the countries in 
which a long-run equilibrium relationship is confirmed. The results show that there is a high variation in 
elasticity estimates between the EU-28 countries. The estimated long-run elasticities are higher than 
their short-run counterparts, which is in line with expectations based on the existing literature. The 
short and long-run income elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand are found to be more elastic than 
their price equivalents. This implies that if a charge on fuel is designed to decrease emissions by 
increasing the price, the charge needs to rise at a higher rate than income. An analysis of the EU’s long-
term emission and fuel consumption reduction targets shows that, with the current tax scheme, it 
cannot be guaranteed that emission targets will be achieved and thus a more stringent fuel tax policy is 
essential.  
Key words: gasoline demand, diesel demand, price elasticity, income elasticity, ARDL Bounds testing, EU 
2030 emissions targets 
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1. Introduction  
Gasoline and diesel demands have been closely examined by academics and politicians in the last few 
decades. In the past the main concern was economic security, because several countries depended on 
the import of fuel from a few countries. However, in the last decade the concern has mainly come from 
the environmental consequences of emissions from fuel consumption. The shift in the origin of concern 
came from an increasing awareness of the environmental consequences of emissions and several 
international dialogues and agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (Sterner, 2007; Basso and 
Oum, 2007).  
With the aim of controlling emissions, many countries have been implementing policies to reduce 
carbon emissions, such as energy and carbon taxation and subsidies for renewable energy. One of the 
most widely used policies is fuel tax (Kayser, 2000; Sterner, 2007; Brons et al., 2008). The effectiveness 
and welfare impacts of a fuel tax depend on how the fuel-consuming sectors of an economy react and 
adjust to the measure. This responsiveness is measured by the elasticity of fuel demand. Elasticities can 
signal important information about the development of fuel consumption as income and prices change 
(Goodwin et al., 2004).  
There is a relatively large body of literature on gasoline and diesel demand elasticity estimates, and 
several reviews have been carried out (Espey, 1998; Graham and Glaister, 2002; Ajanovic et al., 2012; 
Dahl, 2012). Most studies estimate gasoline or diesel demand elasticities for an individual country. Only 
a few studies, such as Baltagi & Griffin (1983) and Sterner et al. (1992), use the same methodology for a 
group of countries, and they cover at most 20 OECD countries. Other studies, such as Espey (1998) and 
Brons et al. (2008), estimate aggregate demand elasticities for regions covering several countries, and in 
some cases the world. The applicability of such an elasticity to a specific country is limited because it 
ignores differences between countries, such as habit formation, productivity, social structure and 
environmental awareness (Goodwin et al., 2004; Basso and Oum, 2007; Hunt & Evans, 2011).  
Dahl (2012) has reviewed the results of gasoline and diesel demand studies and developed elasticities 
for more than 124 countries, including the EU-28 countries. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this 
has been the only study that provides gasoline and diesel demand elasticities covering the EU-28 
countries. However, Dahl (2012) does not estimate these elasticities, but rather compiles them from 
several fuel demand studies. For countries not covered by gasoline and diesel demand studies, Dahl 
(2012) identifies systematic patterns between elasticities and other factors in the existing studies and 
then guesstimates. However, as Graham and Glaister (2002) and Ajanovic et al. (2012) show, elasticity 
estimates for individual countries from different studies are not comparable because the estimated 
elasticities vary depending on the estimation methods, underlying theoretical models and data. Thus, 
existing elasticity estimates do not allow for a consistent comparison of fuel policy effectiveness and 
welfare impact analysis across several countries such as the EU-28.  
The aim of this study is to provide a consistent estimate of short-run and long-run price and income 
elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand across the EU-28. The estimate is consistent in that the same 
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econometric approach, type of data, types of variables and units of measurement are used to estimate 
each country’s elasticity. The elimination of methodological differences means that the estimated 
elasticities are comparable across these countries. The elasticities are estimated using the ARDL Bounds 
testing approach of Pesaran & Shin (1999), which enables the existence of a long-run cointegration 
relationship in gasoline and diesel demands to be tested while estimating short and long-run elasticities. 
In addition, the applicability of the estimated elasticities for EU-28 policy analysis is demonstrated by 
analyzing whether the current existing EU fuel tax policy is sufficient to achieve the 2030 transport 
emissions target. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of gasoline and diesel demand 
studies. The dataset used for estimation is then discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
econometric approach used for estimation. Gasoline and diesel demand elasticities are estimated and 
the results are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, the estimation results are applied to examine the fuel 
charges required to achieve the EU’s 2030 transport emissions goal. The final section provides 
concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review  
Estimation of demand for gasoline and diesel has a long tradition in economics and there have been 
several studies on this. Surveys of the literature are found in Espey (1998), Graham & Glaister (2002, 
2004), Goodwin et al. (2004), Basso & Oum (2007), Brons et al. (2008) and Dahl (2012). In total, these 
seven studies review and analyze more than 600 studies that include over 1000 estimated gasoline and 
diesel demand-related elasticities covering a wide geographical area for the years 1929 to 2010. Most of 
the reviews examine gasoline. For instance, among the studies reviewed by Dahl (2012), 240 are 
gasoline-demand studies for 70 countries, 60 are diesel-demand studies for 55 countries, and 23 
consider other fuel types such as natural gas and biofuels. Goodwin et al. (2004) analyze and present the 
main findings of 69 studies conducted since 1990 in the UK and 26 other countries that are comparable 
to the UK. Among the 69 studies, 43 consider both gasoline and diesel demand. The remaining five 
literature review studies focus mainly on gasoline. A brief summary of the literature surveys is provided 
in Table 1 and discussed in this section.  
Table 1: Brief summary of the main literature review studies 
Study  
Number of 
studies 
reviewed 
Years 
covered Method  Fuel type 
Price elasticity  Income elasticity 
Comment  Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Espey (1998) 101 
1929 to 
1993 
Meta-
analysis  Gasoline 
0 to -1.36 
(avg. -0.26) 
0 to -2.72 
(avg. -
0.58) 
0 to 2.92 (avg. 
0.47) 
0.05 to 
2.73 (avg. 
0.88)  Focuses on gasoline 
Graham & 
Glaister (2002)  50 
1950 to 
2000 Review  Gasoline -0.2 to -0.3 
-0.6 to -
0.8  0.35 to 0.55 1.1 to 1.3  Automobile fuel  
Goodwin et al. 
(2004) 69 
1929 to 
1991 Review  
Gasoline/ 
Diesel -0.01 to -
0.57 (avg. -
0 to -1.81 
(avg. -
0 to 0.89 (avg. 
0.39) 0.27 to 
1.71 (avg. 
Focuses on the UK 
and UK-comparable 
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0.25) 0.64)  1.08) countries. Road fuel 
Graham & 
Glaister (2004)  113 
1966 to 
2000 Review  Gasoline 
-2.13 to 0.59 
(avg. –0.25) 
-22.00 to 
0.85 (avg. 
–0.77) 
0.0 to 1.71 
(avg. 0.47) 
0.0 to 2.68 
(avg. 0.93) Fuel demand 
Basso & Oum 
(2007) 100s 
1980s to 
2000s 
Critical 
assessment  
Gasoline -0.2 to -0.3 
-0.6 to -
0.8 0.3 to 0.5 0.9 to 1.3 
Automobile 
gasoline. 
Companion to the 
above studies. 
Comparison of non-
popular models 
(cointegration). 
Diesel estimate for 
Indonesia Diesel -0.13 -0.67 0.57 to 2.14 2.16 
Brons et al. 
(2008) 43 
1970s to 
2000 
Meta-
analysis Gasoline 
−1.36 to  
0.37 (avg. 
−0.34) 
−2.04 
to −0.12 
(avg. 
−0.84) - - 
Meta-analysis. 
Gasoline demand. A 
SUR approach 
Dahl (2012) 
300 
1929 to 
2006 
Review and 
systematic 
deduction  
Gasoline 
-1.65 to 0.63 
(avg. -0.18) 
-61.11 to 
5.89 (avg. 
-1.61) 
-2.63 to 3.00 
(avg. 0.28) 
-40.00 to 
38.89 
(avg. 1.57) 
Gasoline and diesel 
price elasticities are 
developed for 124 
countries 60 Diesel Average -0.16 Average 1.23 
Ajanovic et al. 
(2012) 
  
Survey 
Gasoline 
-0.20 to  
-0.30 
-0.60 to -
0.85 0.30 to 0.50 
0.90 to 
1.40   
  Diesel -0.10 -0.31 0.39 1.36  
 
Graham & Glaister (2004), which constitutes an update of Graham & Glaister (2002), covers a wide 
range of road traffic-related elasticity estimates, such as car travel, car ownership, freight traffic and fuel 
demand. Their analysis of car trips and kilometers travelled by car (car-km) shows that in the short run 
households respond to price change by adjusting car trips, but in the long run they respond by 
considerably adjusting kilometers travelled. This is explained by adaptations in terms of mode choice, 
destination choice, relocation of population, and retail and service activities. Graham & Glaister (2002) 
find that, in absolute values, income elasticity is greater than price elasticity. This implies that price 
needs to rise more quickly than income for fuel consumption to remain the same. This is supported by 
the findings of Basso and Oum (2007) and Brons et al. (2008) who show that gasoline demand responds 
more to an income change than to a price change.   
Goodwin et al. (2004) adopt the same methodology as Espey (1998) and run a meta-analysis to 
investigate sources of variation in elasticities. The results do not indicate any systematic pattern that 
explains the variations. Total fuel consumption and total vehicle fleet are more responsive to a price 
change of gasoline than diesel, and private cars are more sensitive than freight vehicles. However, for an 
income change the responsiveness of private cars and freight vehicles are not found to be significantly 
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different from one other. Goodwin et al. (2004) show that in the UK and countries that are comparable 
to the UK, a fuel demand adjustment to a 10 % increase in price is divided between a decrease of about 
2.5 % in the first year and a gradual long-run adjustment, which sums up to 6 % in the long run. The fleet 
of vehicles also gradually adjusts to the change in price. A 10 % price increase leads to an approximate 
1 % fall in traffic volume within a year, and a total 3 % reduction in the long run. A price fall also has 
implications for fuel efficiency and the total number of vehicles owned. A price decrease of 10 % leads 
to a 1.5 % increase in fuel efficiency and a 1 % decrease in the total number of vehicles owned in the 
short run, and a 4 % increase in fuel efficiency and 2.5 % decrease in the total number of vehicles owned 
in the long run. Likewise, a 10 % increase in real income leads to a 4 % increase in the short run and a 
10 % increase in the long run of both total fuel consumption and number of vehicles owned. However 
traffic volume shows a lower increase: 2 % within a year and about 5 % in the longer run. The reason 
why fuel consumption responds more than traffic volume to a given price change might be that it is 
easier to adjust driving habits than change vehicles. Moreover, a price increase leads to higher 
utilization of relatively fuel-efficient vehicles and a technical improvement to existing vehicles. 
Brons et al. (2008) review 158 price elasticities of total gasoline demand from 43 primary studies using a 
SUR model with cross-equation restrictions, which enables them to combine and perform a meta-
analysis of different estimations. The results show that price elasticity is lower when consumers rely on 
automobiles for transport services. In the short and long run, gasoline demand responds to a price 
change mainly by adjusting fuel efficiency and mileage per car and with a relatively small adjustment in 
car ownership. Gasoline demand is more price elastic in the long run than in the short run. Their result 
suggests that gasoline demand is not very responsive to a price change.  
A comparison of gasoline and diesel demand studies by Dahl (2012) shows that countries with lower 
gasoline and diesel prices and lower income have less elastic demand. Price elasticities tend to increase 
as both price and income increase. Dahl’s study does not find a significant change in price elasticity of 
diesel demand for countries that have introduced diesel-favoring policies. However, the higher income 
elasticity of diesel demand for OECD-member European countries might indicate the impact of favorable 
policies for diesel. The study finds that after the introduction of turbo engines in the 1990s, diesel 
demand became 50 % more elastic in comparison to studies conducted based on prior data. Models that 
do not include the stock of vehicles report higher income elasticity than models that include the stock of 
vehicles, and 10 % of the income elasticities reviewed are negative. In addition, Dahl (2012) analyzes the 
effect of diesel price on gasoline consumption using a simple static demand model and finds no viable 
link between diesel price and gasoline consumption or price elasticity of gasoline demand.  
Dahl (2012) uses these findings to provide elasticities for 124 countries, including the EU-28. These 
elasticities are developed based on gasoline demand studies of 70 countries and diesel demand studies 
of 60 countries. For the remaining countries for which a fuel demand study is missing, elasticities are 
developed based on the author’s intuition and using the identified patterns between the existing 
estimates. The identified patterns are also used to correct some of the reviewed estimates. The 
intuitively developed elasticities do not capture a specific country’s gasoline and diesel consumption 
behavior, which would have been revealed from an estimation based on actual data. In addition, as 
Graham & Glaister (2002) show, elasticity estimates for individual countries by different studies are not 
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comparable because the elasticities vary based on the estimation methods, theoretical models, 
assumptions, exogenous variables, data types and measurements used in the studies. 
Dahl (2012) argues that the developed elasticities do not clearly consider the impacts of policies that 
encourage a shift from gasoline to diesel or generally from fossil fuels to alternative fuels. If these 
policies are aimed at raising the individual fuel price or if the substitution of other fuels has been 
relatively small, then the bias in the constructed elasticities will be smaller and they can still be 
considered useful. However if the policies are aimed at raising substitute fuel prices, then the estimated 
elasticities might suffer from omitted variable bias of cross-price elasticities. In such cases the developed 
elasticities are biased and do not properly capture the correct responsiveness, and therefore need to be 
adjusted.  
The survey of the studies summarized in Table 1 shows that there is a high variation between estimated 
elasticities. The highest variation is reported in Dahl (2012) for the long-run price elasticity of gasoline 
ranging from -61.11 to 5.89 and long-run income elasticity of gasoline from -40.00 to 38.89. One of the 
main determinants of this variation is the models employed by the studies (Basso and Oum, 2007). The 
models can be classified into two broad categories: static and dynamic models. Espey (1998) and Brons 
et al. (2008) show that the choice of a static or dynamic model is a significant determinant of variations 
in elasticity estimates.  
A large number of studies base their analysis on static models, and assume that the observed demand is 
in a long-run equilibrium. These static models overlook the fact that impacts of price and income shocks 
linger for more than one period and there are adjustment lags in demands. Basso and Oum (2007) and 
Dahl (2012) show that static models capture the price elasticity of an intermediate run, which falls 
somewhere between short run and long run unless a long-run cointegration relationship exists. When 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship, the estimates from static models are close to the long-run 
estimates from dynamic models. Static models have been shown to deliver the same income elasticity as 
long-run income elasticity from more sophisticated models.   
Studies that use dynamic models report separate results of short-run and long-run elasticities 
accounting for adjustment lags. A common approach of accounting for adjustment lags in dynamic 
models is to include a lagged dependent variable in the estimated model, and the first lag is most 
common. Espey (1998) and Basso and Oum (2007) suggest that this is too restrictive because it assumes 
a constant geometric adjustment process over time. Distributed lag and inverted-v lag models can be 
more flexible approaches of capturing adjustment lags. However, Basso and Oum (2007) show that 
these models do not perform any better, they require many parameters to be estimated and lead to a 
multicollinearity problem. Thus, using the first lag of a dependent variable to capture the dynamic 
property of demand has remained a dominant practice.  
Basso and Oum (2007) show that dynamic models of cointegration and error correction models, which 
take into consideration the possible non-stationarity of time series data used in fuel demand studies, 
provide robust estimates of short-run and long-run elasticities. Studies that use these models report 
relatively inelastic long-run gasoline and diesel demand elasticities compared to studies that use other 
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dynamic models (Espey, 1998; Goodwin et al., 2004; Basso and Oum, 2007). Studies that use 
cointegration techniques argue that this is because of a correct handling of time series data. Goodwin et 
al. (2004) compare error correction models, partial adjustment models and inverted-v lag models and 
show that model choice has a significant effect on the difference in estimated elasticities. In addition, 
the choice of estimation methods, such as ordinary least squares and instrumental variables, is found to 
be a significant determinant of elasticity variations between studies by Goodwin et al. (2004).  
Results of gasoline and diesel demand estimates also vary because of different functional forms used for 
the estimation (Graham & Glaister (2002, 2004)). The log-linear functional form has been popular in the 
literature. Basso and Oum (2007) suggest that more flexible functional forms, such as trans-log and non-
parametric approaches, could provide a better estimation when household data are used. Goodwin et 
al. (2004) compare different functional forms (linear, log-linear, semilog, Box-Cox, and other non-linear) 
and show that the functional form has no significant effect on the elasticity estimate. In contrast, Espey 
(1998) finds that functional forms are important and that the log-linear form is the most appropriate for 
gasoline demand estimation.  
Studies also differ with respect to the data types used for the estimation. Goodwin et al. (2004) show 
that the data type (time series, cross-sectional or panel data) and the interval of data (monthly, 
quarterly or annual) introduces a significant variation between estimated elasticities. A comparison of 
elasticities estimated from time series data and cross-sectional data by Basso and Oum (2007) and Brons 
et al. (2008) highlights mixed findings regarding the magnitude of the differences. However, cross-
sectional data usually result in higher short-run and long-run price elasticities in absolute values and 
lower short-run income elasticity than estimates from time series data, while no significant difference is 
found for long-run income elasticity. Dahl (2012) also finds higher price elasticities in absolute values 
from cross-sectional data than from time series and panel data. Espey (1998) finds a higher short-run 
price elasticity from cross-sectional data and a lower short-run price elasticity from panel data 
compared to time series data. Long-run estimates from cross-sectional, panel and time series data are 
not found to be significantly different from one other by Espey (1998). Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether to classify the elasticities estimated from cross-sectional data as short run, long run or 
intermediate run. As cross-sectional data are a one-time observation across several entities, they do not 
have the time components of dynamic models. In addition, cross-sectional data do not take into account 
the time lag in consumer response to a change in price and income, and can therefore lead to 
specification bias. It is shown that unbiased estimation of elasticities requires dynamic models that 
include the time component of consumer behavior (Basso and Oum, 2007).  
Another common practice in the literature is to use panel data for pooled estimation that assumes 
common elasticities across countries (Basso and Oum, 2007). Goodwin et al. (2004) show that pooled 
estimation tends to result in a lower elasticity estimate in absolute values. However, Espey (1998) shows 
that panel data estimation results in more elastic short-run price elasticity and less elastic long-run price 
elasticity, while no significant difference is observed between panel data and time series for income 
elasticity. Pooled panel data estimation, just like cross-sectional data, does not enable a country or 
region-specific estimation of elasticities. It has been shown by Basso and Oum (2007) that the 
assumption of common elasticities of fuel demand across countries is implausible. The problems with 
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pooled panel estimation can be mitigated using dummy variables and allowing the intercept in the 
estimation to vary across countries or regions (fixed effect estimation). However, the reviewed studies 
have shown that this does not lead to fully capturing regional or country-specific characteristics. The 
review by Basso and Oum (2007) of findings of dynamic and cointegration estimation results shows that 
individual time series estimation is preferred and more likely to capture country-specific characteristics.  
Another source of variation in diesel and gasoline demand elasticity estimates is the periodicity of the 
data. There are mixed results on how the frequency of data affects estimated elasticities. Dahl (2012) 
shows that elasticities estimates on monthly and quarterly data are significantly different from 
estimates on annual data, but their mean values are not significantly different from one other. The 
comparison of elasticities by Basso and Oum (2007) estimated on yearly and seasonal data shows that 
there is no clear pattern in the reviewed studies. However Goodwin et al. (2004) show that lower price 
elasticity and higher income elasticity are reported from annual data. Espey (1998) argues that data 
periodicity does not have an impact on long-run elasticity, but short-run elasticities from monthly data 
are higher because fuel demand responses occur within a month. This is better captured by seasonal 
data, leading to higher estimates in absolute values. Espey (1998) argues that as long as due caution is 
exercised, seasonal data are just as appropriate for estimating long-run adjustments as annual data.  
Data aggregation is an additional source of variation in gasoline and diesel demand elasticity estimates. 
The data can be household data, aggregated at a regional or country level, which can have significant 
effects on the estimated elasticities of fuel demand (Graham & Glaister, 2004). Basso and Oum (2007) 
show that elasticities are usually estimated from aggregate country-level data, mainly because of the 
relative availability of data and ease in interpreting results. However, it is argued that gasoline demand 
should be analyzed using disaggregated household data because gasoline consumption decisions are 
made at household level (Basso and Oum, 2007). Studies that use household data report the same price 
elasticities, but lower income elasticities as studies that use aggregate data. Goodwin et al. (2004) 
compare results from aggregate, per capita and per household data and show that per capita data gives 
lower price elasticities and higher income elasticities than the others. In contrast, Espey (1998) shows 
that the estimation of elasticities based on aggregate, per household, per capita or per vehicle bases 
does not produce a significant difference.  
Basso and Oum (2007) show that the use of disaggregated household data highlights important 
determinants that would otherwise not be detected, such as household income level, location, 
demographic characteristics such as the age of the household head, gender, race, education and the 
number of licensed drivers in the household. Graham & Glaister (2002) report that the use of 
disaggregated household data can provide insights into the time dependency of consumers’ fuel-
demand response. In addition disaggregated data allow for more flexibility of exogenous variables 
included in the estimated models than aggregate data. However it has been shown that it is difficult to 
determine income effects from disaggregated data as income effect is found to be insignificant in the 
studies reviewed by Graham & Glaister (2002). Basso and Oum (2007) point out that among the studies 
surveyed by Espey (1998), only 5 % use disaggregated household data. Aggregated data have remained 
the main input to elasticity estimation.  
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In conclusion, despite data time length and cross-sectional width and methodological differences, there 
is a consensus among the studies that long-run elasticities are higher than short-run elasticities for both 
price and income by a factor of 2 to 3 on average. The income elasticity of gasoline demand is slightly 
higher than price elasticity by a factor of 1.5 to 3 (Goodwin, 2004). In the short run, households react to 
price change by adjusting vehicle utilization and in the long run by adjusting vehicle stock. The main 
determinants of gasoline and diesel demand are the respective prices, income, number of vehicles and 
population. However, several other factors are shown to affect gasoline and diesel demand, such as 
vehicle efficiency, urbanization, female labor force participation, industrial production, seasons, 
weather, family demographics, price of transit, price volatility, price or availability of public transit, and 
speed limits. It is also shown that, generally, elasticities vary considerably depending on the underlying 
model, estimation technique, data type, study area and the number of exogenous factors considered in 
the study.  
3. Data  
The literature review in the previous section shows that even though gasoline and diesel demand 
studies cover a wide variety of factors, the main determinants of gasoline and diesel demand are price, 
income, number of vehicles and demographic pressure. Therefore the data for the elasticity estimation 
in this study includes the prices of gasoline and diesel, the quantity of gasoline and diesel consumed, the 
total number of vehicles and population.  
Gasoline and diesel consumption data cover the transport sector of the EU-28 countries. The transport 
sector consumes the largest percentage of the two fuels in each of the 28 EU countries. From 1960 to 
2013, the average annual consumption by the transport sector in the EU was 98.86 % of gasoline and 51 
% of diesel (IEA, 2014). Gasoline is mainly consumed by passenger vehicles and diesel is consumed by 
passenger vehicles and heavy vehicles such as buses, lorries and tractors. Based on the behavioral 
differences of consumers of the two fuels, the regression results of gasoline and diesel demand may 
behave differently.  
The quantity of gasoline and diesel consumed is measured by total final consumption in the transport 
sector from the IEA (2016c) for OECD countries and from the IEA (2016d) for non-OECD countries. The 
quantity consumed per driver in kiloliters is calculated using data on population between the ages of 15 
and 69 from the United Nations (2015) as an approximation for the number of drivers. Gasoline and 
diesel consumption is divided by the number of drivers instead of total population, following Pock 
(2010), because, as Schmalensee & Stoker (1999) show, using total population instead of the number of 
drivers leads to an overestimation of elasticities as it does not properly take demographic effects into 
account (Basso and Oum, 2007; Pock, 2010). Pock (2010) argues that a household owning a second 
vehicle does not necessarily double fuel consumption or kilometers driven. It also holds true that 
doubling the members of a household does not necessarily double vehicle utilization or fuel 
consumption because the number of drivers in the household is not likely to double. This effect is better 
captured by estimating fuel demand on a per driver basis instead of on a per capita basis.  
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Data on the prices of gasoline and diesel are obtained from the IEA (2016a) for OECD countries and the 
IEA (2016b) for non-OECD countries. For Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and 
Slovenia, additional data from the World Bank world development indicators are used. The prices are 
tax-inclusive end-user prices in US dollars per liter. Real prices are calculated using CPI from the World 
Bank world development indicators, except for the United Kingdom for which the data are from its 
national statistics website listed on the “United Nations Information on National Statistical Systems” 
(2016).  
Illustrations of the data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the prices of gasoline and diesel have been 
steadily increasing, with a sharp decline after 2008 and 2013, which coincides with the 2008 economic 
crisis and the 2013 global oil price fall. This suggests that there can be a structural break in the dataset 
that affects estimation results if not properly taken into account. Gasoline consumption per driver has 
been more or less constant from 1978 to 2003 and then fallen slightly. There could be multiple reasons 
for this, such as the rise in prices, emission control policies and an increase in vehicle efficiency. In 
contrast, diesel consumption per driver fell until 1984 and then remained constant until 1995. It 
increased from 1995 to 2005 and has then been falling again. The average increase in diesel 
consumption per driver from the 1990s to the 2000s could be explained by diesel-favoring policies and 
an efficiency gain by diesel vehicles for long-distance drivers (Dahl, 2012). The fall starting from the mid-
2000s could be explained by the combination of several factors such as more stringent fuel consumption 
policies, environmental awareness and increasing prices. On the other hand, average per capita income 
across the EU-28 has been steadily rising, except for the fall between 1988 and 1993 and after 2008. 
 
 
Figure 1: EU average annual gasoline price 
and consumption per driver 
Figure 2: EU average annual diesel price and 
consumption per driver 
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Per capita income used in the estimation is real GDP per capita in US dollars obtained from the World 
Bank world development indicators. Data on the number of vehicles are collected from EUROSTAT and 
the individual countries’ national statistics websites listed on the “United Nations Information on 
National Statistical Systems” (2016). It was impossible to obtain sufficient data on the number of 
vehicles disaggregated into diesel and gasoline-powered vehicles across the 28 EU countries. Therefore 
only the total number of vehicles is used in the estimation. The total number of vehicles is sufficient for 
a consistent estimation, but it is not possible to infer substitution between gasoline and diesel engine-
powered vehicles and utilization behaviors from the estimated coefficients (Pock, 2010).  
Data are collected for each country from 1978 to 2013, but data availability varies between countries. As 
shown in the summary statistics in Table 2, complete data of the quantity of gasoline and diesel 
consumed are available for 23 countries, and for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia it is available 
from 1990 to 2013. Long-term data series of prices of gasoline and diesel are available for all countries 
except Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia, where price data is available from 1995 to 2013. 
GDP data from 1978 to 2013 is available for most countries except Estonia and Slovenia, where GDP 
data were available from 1995 to 2013. The number of vehicles for nine countries is available from 1990 
to 2013. Number of vehicles is not included in the gasoline demand estimation for Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Latvia or the diesel demand estimation for Slovenia because the available data are not 
sufficient for optimal choice of lag length in the estimated models. For the remaining countries, a higher 
number of observations is available, as shown in the summary statistics in Table 2.  
The summary statistics on Table 2 shows that average gasoline and diesel consumption per driver varied 
slightly between countries, with an exceptionally high level in Luxembourg. Gasoline consumption per 
driver varied from 0.0023 kiloliters in Romania to 1.38 kiloliters in Luxembourg. Furthermore, Romania 
had the lowest and Luxembourg the highest variation in gasoline consumption per driver during the 
sample period. Diesel consumption per driver varied from 0.0041 kiloliters in Romania to 3.13 kiloliters 
in Luxembourg. Luxembourg also had the highest mean GDP per capita and number of vehicles per 
driver, as well has the highest variation in GDP per capita. The highest variation in the number of 
vehicles per driver for the sample years was in Cyprus. The lowest mean GDP per capita was in Bulgaria, 
and Romania had the lowest variation in GDP per capita during the sample period. The lowest mean 
number of vehicles per driver was also in Romania, and the lowest variation was in Denmark. Low mean 
consumption of gasoline and diesel in Romania coincided with a high level in the mean real price of 
gasoline and diesel, at 543.1 USD/liter and 659.5 USD/liter respectively, and with high variation during 
the sample period. The high real prices are a result of the high inflation rise from 1990 to 2013 
measured by the CPI. Even though the highest mean consumption of gasoline and diesel per driver was 
in Luxembourg, the lowest mean real price of gasoline was in Lithuania and the lowest mean real price 
of diesel was in Cyprus. Malta and Slovenia had the lowest variation in real prices of gasoline and diesel 
respectively.  
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Country 
Gasoline consumption per 
driver in kiloliters 
Diesel consumption per 
driver in kiloliters 
Real price of diesel in USD 
per liter 
Real price of gasoline in USD 
per liter Real GDP per capita in USD 
Number of vehicles per 
driver 
max min mean sd N max min mean sd N max min mean sd N max min mean sd N max min mean sd N max min mean sd N 
Austria 0.49 0.28 0.39 0.06 35 1.18 0.37 0.74 0.29 35 1.85 0.79 1.15 0.29 36 1.90 0.98 1.31 0.26 36 41366.5 22034.2 32203.6 6347.7 36 0.75 0.52 0.66 0.07 24 
Belgium 0.43 0.15 0.32 0.09 35 1.35 0.82 1.14 0.15 35 1.93 0.53 1.06 0.41 36 2.19 0.94 1.47 0.37 36 38556.3 22148.7 30962.3 5530.8 36 0.70 0.45 0.59 0.09 36 
Bulgaria 0.01 0.002 0.003 0.001 35 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.002 35 15.98 0.85 2.47 4.07 18 28.26 0.90 3.50 7.04 18 4807.7 2214.1 3187.5 846.7 34 0.52 0.13 0.33 0.11 25 
Croatia 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.03 24 0.50 0.23 0.38 0.10 24 1.61 0.79 1.23 0.28 20 1.67 0.96 1.33 0.24 20 11516 6604 9475.7 1499.8 20 0.50 0.19 0.35 0.11 23 
Cyprus 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 35 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.003 35 1.28 0.23 0.78 0.35 15 2.21 0.78 1.22 0.34 34 24312.9 9068 17724.4 4674.5 36 0.85 0.30 0.64 0.14 25 
Czech 
Republic 0.28 0.13 0.20 0.05 35 0.49 0.29 0.40 0.06 35 1.91 0.73 1.23 0.40 21 1.94 0.90 1.35 0.34 21 15170.1 9094.6 11981.3 2208.5 24 0.60 0.25 0.46 0.09 23 
Denmark 0.51 0.33 0.44 0.05 35 1.54 0.75 0.96 0.20 35 1.93 0.40 0.99 0.48 36 2.18 1.06 1.57 0.33 36 50695 29306.9 40882.4 6863.2 36 0.56 0.38 0.46 0.05 33 
Estonia 0.45 0.20 0.29 0.05 23 0.59 0.27 0.42 0.11 23 1.57 0.58 1.01 0.31 19 1.56 0.68 1.13 0.36 19 12443.5 4995.3 9055.3 2461.8 19 0.64 0.12 0.43 0.13 24 
Finland 0.54 0.38 0.46 0.05 35 1.20 0.88 0.95 0.08 35 1.87 0.80 1.16 0.33 36 2.14 1.07 1.51 0.34 36 42414 19640.6 30966.9 7001.2 36 0.79 0.52 0.61 0.09 24 
France 0.44 0.16 0.33 0.11 36 0.92 0.69 0.80 0.16 36 1.89 0.77 1.13 0.36 36 2.07 1.02 1.47 0.33 36 36074.7 22402 29985.1 4637.3 36 0.75 0.50 0.63 0.08 34 
Germany 0.53 0.31 0.45 0.07 35 1.04 0.66 0.83 0.08 35 1.98 0.77 1.23 0.42 23 2.16 1.06 1.50 0.39 23 39273.4 22015.6 30768.5 5288.6 36 0.79 0.41 0.62 0.13 34 
Greece 0.50 0.19 0.35 0.10 35 0.79 0.35 0.56 0.13 35 6.57 0.75 1.93 1.44 36 17.29 0.93 3.64 4.43 36 24307 14668 17930.4 3070.5 36 0.68 0.13 0.33 0.17 33 
Hungary 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.02 35 0.46 0.19 0.33 0.08 35 6.78 1.15 2.85 1.65 34 12.24 1.26 4.54 3.69 34 11749.8 7254.8 9572.8 1698.1 23 0.43 0.11 0.29 0.10 37 
Ireland 0.59 0.32 0.43 0.09 35 1.06 0.40 0.70 0.22 35 1.92 0.85 1.35 0.27 36 2.26 0.94 1.52 0.30 36 52923.5 16552.9 33101.6 13396 36 0.59 0.34 0.49 0.09 23 
Italy 0.45 0.21 0.33 0.07 35 0.65 0.49 0.56 0.05 35 2.07 0.89 1.32 0.33 36 3.66 1.16 1.95 0.64 36 32829.9 19248.5 27408.2 4141.4 36 0.88 0.44 0.70 0.14 34 
Latvia 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.001 23 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.003 23 1.60 0.62 1.08 0.32 18 1.69 0.89 1.24 0.28 18 8999 3166.1 5502.7 1732.6 36 0.59 0.14 0.34 0.14 23 
Lithuania 0.01 0.002 0.004 0.002 23 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.002 23 1.24 0.46 0.86 0.26 18 1.32 0.62 0.96 0.21 18 10549.2 3818.5 6779.7 2220.5 24 0.77 0.09 0.44 0.21 24 
Luxembourg 1.83 0.89 1.38 0.33 35 5.41 1.58 3.14 1.29 35 1.66 0.54 0.91 0.32 35 1.78 0.78 1.17 0.30 35 86127.2 32111.2 59390.7 18640.5 36 1.03 0.47 0.80 0.19 36 
Malta 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.001 35 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.003 35 1.30 0.40 0.85 0.27 15 1.34 0.48 1.02 0.18 15 16735.9 6343.2 11805.7 3501 36 0.82 0.44 0.68 0.10 23 
Netherlands 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.02 35 0.60 0.37 0.49 0.06 35 1.93 0.57 1.08 0.38 36 2.37 0.92 1.52 0.39 36 45147.8 25450.1 34798.1 6846.5 36 0.68 0.45 0.54 0.07 33 
Poland 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.02 35 0.41 0.14 0.22 0.08 35 148.8  0.65 13.09 34.38 28 223.3 0.85 18.52 50.18 28 10781.7 4411.4 7299.5 2108.6 24 0.65 0.20 0.40 0.13 23 
Portugal 0.28 0.10 0.19 0.06 35 0.63 0.17 0.40 0.17 35 3.27 0.72 1.48 0.64 36 8.66 1.00 2.58 2.10 36 19488.8 9778.8 15375.9 3414.5 36 0.77 0.19 0.50 0.21 34 
Romania 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.0004 35 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.001 35 543.1 0.91 37.10 122.5 20 659.5 1.18 45.70 149.2 20 6072.8 3087.5 4241.2 922.1 34 0.31 0.04 0.15 0.09 33 
Slovak 
Republic 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.03 35 0.35 0.18 0.26 0.05 35 2 0.86 1.41 0.30 21 1.94 0.94 1.47 0.31 21 15369.3 6781.5 10917.6 2991.7 22 0.64 0.39 0.47 0.07 22 
Slovenia 0.63 0.34 0.47 0.08 23 1.14 0.40 0.77 0.20 23 1.72 0.87 1.18 0.24 19 1.87 0.95 1.25 0.25 19 20987 12422.6 17015.7 2626.4 19 0.70 0.33 0.50 0.14 33 
Spain 0.32 0.14 0.24 0.05 35 0.92 0.31 0.57 0.21 35 1.75 0.79 1.20 0.30 36 3.54 0.95 1.63 0.63 36 27660.4 14654 21084.4 4576.4 36 0.66 0.28 0.50 0.13 34 
Sweden 0.70 0.41 0.60 0.06 35 1.33 0.57 0.76 0.19 35 2.15 0.60 1.15 0.44 36 2.17 1.05 1.49 0.34 36 46036.9 25481 35436.8 6815.1 36 0.66 0.50 0.60 0.06 34 
United 
Kingdom 0.57 0.29 0.47 0.08 35 0.53 0.34 0.43 0.06 35 2.27 1.02 1.48 0.38 36 2.13 1.07 1.51 0.34 36 41567.4 21774.1 31823.3 6774.5 36 0.67 0.39 0.55 0.09 33 
Table 2: Data summary statistics. 
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4. Econometric approach 
Following the literature, gasoline demand is defined as a function of gasoline price, GDP per capita and 
number of vehicles per driver for each member country of the EU-28. Likewise, diesel demand is defined 
as a function of diesel price, GDP per capita and number of vehicles for each member country of the EU-
28. 
Gasoline and diesel demands are estimated using the ARDL Bounds testing approach, which was first 
proposed by Pesaran & Shin (1999) and later extended by Pesaran et al. (2001). The ARDL Bounds 
testing approach fit the purposes of this study well because it enables the existence of a long-run 
relationship to be tested while estimating long-run and short-run elasticities. The method has several 
advantages. It is unbiased in the presence of endogenous regressors and it performs well in small 
samples (Haug, 2002). It enables the existence of a long run-relationship among the dependent and 
independent variables to be tested, even if they are not integrated of the same order. Other 
cointegration tests, such as the Engle-Granger and Johansen tests, require regressors to be integrated of 
the same order, specifically order one, and do not perform well when the variables are not integrated of 
the same order. In the ARDL Bounds setup, the variables can be I(0) and/or I(1), however the method is 
not applicable if any of the variables are I(2).  
The ARDL Bounds test of long-run cointegration based on the estimation of the unrestricted error 
correction model (ECM) is given as (see Pesaran et al., 2001):  
∆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐0,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,0𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1
+ �𝛽𝛽1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖Δ𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝛽𝛽2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖Δ𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝛽𝛽3,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖Δ𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖Δ𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗
𝑖𝑖=1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is fuel demand at time t with j=1,2 (1 for gasoline and 2 for diesel) and 𝑒𝑒 = 1,2, … ,28 
represents the 28 EU countries. 𝑑𝑑 represents impulse dummies of structural breaks, 𝑡𝑡 is trend variable, 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗, j=1, 2, 𝑃𝑃1is the price of gasoline and 𝑃𝑃2 is the price of diesel for the 28 EU countries, 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 is GDP 
per capita, 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 is the total number of vehicles per driver and 𝜀𝜀 is the error term. Δ denotes difference.  
The upper bounds of the summations of the differenced explanatory variables and dependent variable 
(𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗ ), which are the optimal lag lengths, are determined using Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz criterion (SC). The Bounds test tests 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,0 = 0, 𝛼𝛼1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼3,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 = 0,∀ 𝑒𝑒, 𝑗𝑗, no long-
run relationship against 𝐻𝐻1: 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,0 ≠ 0,𝛼𝛼1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0,𝛼𝛼2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0,𝛼𝛼3,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0. The computed F-statistic has a 
non-standard distribution for which Pesaran et al. (2001) provide lower and higher bound critical values 
for the case when all regressors are I(0) and I(1), respectively, and Narayan (2005) provides the small 
sample equivalent of the critical values. Equation (1) is estimated with or without constant, trend and 
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dummies, and then the F-statistic is compared to the critical values. If the test statistic is above the 
critical value then it shows the existence of cointegration and a long-run equilibrium relationship. If the 
test statistic falls within the bounds of the critical values, the test is inconclusive. If the test statistic falls 
below the critical values, then the test shows that there is no long-run relationship.  
The variables are estimated in log form and the estimated 𝛽𝛽1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,0 gives the short-run price elasticity and 
𝛽𝛽2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,0 gives the short-run income elasticities (see Pesaran & Shin, 1999). The long-run price and income 
elasticities, respectively, are  
𝛽𝛽1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽1,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗𝑖𝑖=01 − ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗𝑖𝑖=0 , 𝛽𝛽2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽2,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗
𝑖𝑖=01 − ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗𝑖𝑖=0  
The standard errors for the long-run elasticities can be calculated from the standard errors of the 
original regression using the delta method.  
Before proceeding to the estimation of an ARDL model and Bounds testing, the variables are tested for 
unit root in order to ensure that none of the variables are I(2). Usually economic variables are 
susceptible to external shocks that occur outside the economic framework, such as natural disasters and 
unforeseen political measures. These kinds of exogenous shocks induce structural breaks in the flow of 
the observed data of variables. Thus the unit root tests are conducted using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
and Phillips-Perron unit root tests that do not consider structural breaks and the Zivot-Andrews unit root 
test, which allows for an endogenous structural break in the test. The test results are shown in Tables 3, 
4 and 5. The test results of the variables considered in the estimation of individual countries show that 
they are a mixture of I(0) and I(1), but none of them are I(2). 
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Table 3: Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
 
lg ld lpg lpd lgdp lvt 
Country Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. 
Austria 0.693 -5.089* I(1) -0.531 -5.363* I(1) -1.209 -5.312* I(1) -1.182 -5.288* I(1) -1.865 -5.059* I(1) -3.344** -3.003** I(0) 
Belgium 1.663 -4.135* I(1) -1.294 -5.079* I(1) -0.830 -4.197* I(1) -0.844 -4.840* I(1) -2.093 -4.382* I(1) -2.778* -2.255** I(0) 
Bulgaria -1.618 -6.349* I(1) -1.961 -6.533* I(1) -4.626* -3.173** I(0) -4.169* -3.526* I(0) 0.148 -3.183* I(1) -0.987 -5.320* I(1) 
Croatia -1.180 -3.319** I(1) -0.538 -4.891* I(1) -0.655 -2.398** I(1) -0.458 -1.942** I(1) -2.994** -3.220** I(0) -0.544 -2.366** I(1) 
Cyprus -0.377 -2.208** I(1) -2.649* -5.472* I(1) -1.057 -3.883* I(1) -0.866 -3.203** I(1) -4.397* -3.077** I(0) -0.846 -2.637* I(1) 
Czech Republic -1.138 -8.365* I(1) -0.802 -4.271* I(1) -0.598 -3.536* I(1) -0.496 -4.042* I(1) -0.092 -4.930* I(1) -1.220 -2.436** I(1) 
Denmark 0.711 -1.984** I(1) -2.393 -5.038* I(1) -1.241 -4.175* I(1) -0.370 -4.939* I(1) -2.281 -4.044* I(1) 0.659 -3.296** I(1) 
Estonia -3.770* -4.337* I(0) -1.035 -4.235* I(1) -0.775 -3.626* I(1) -0.374 -3.880* I(1) -2.009 -2.497** I(1) -2.496 -3.276** I(1) 
Finland -1.112 -3.531*** I(1) -3.682* -4.483* I(0) -1.165 -4.461* I(1) -1.072 -4.912* I(1) -1.856 -3.589* I(1) 2.573 -2.644* I(1) 
France 3.840 -2.577* I(1) -1.315 -3.816* I(1) -1.218 -4.284* I(1) -0.854 -4.638* I(1) -2.084 -3.898* I(1) -1.861 -2.955** I(1) 
Germany 1.848 -3.800* I(1) -2.999** -6.691* I(0) -0.532 -3.597* I(1) -0.389 -4.055* I(1) -1.271 -5.209* I(1) -1.781 -4.191* I(1) 
Greece -2.357 -3.431* I(1) -1.424 -4.270* I(1) -3.535* -3.639* I(0) -1.962 -4.331* I(1) -0.920 -2.323** I(1) -0.282 -5.228* I(1) 
Hungary -1.716 -3.844* I(1) -1.447 -4.506* I(1) -1.115 -5.601* I(1) -1.530 -6.787* I(1) -0.662 -3.194** I(1) -6.225* -4.271* I(0) 
Ireland -0.658 -2.428** I(1) -0.941 -3.494* I(1) -1.237 -4.574* I(1) -1.224 -5.328* I(1) -1.217 -2.392** I(1) -2.288 -2.863** I(1) 
Italy 0.460 -2.328** I(1) -1.606 -4.465* I(1) -2.410 -4.237* I(1) -0.978 -5.011* I(1) -3.744* -3.377** I(0) -5.073* -3.287** I(0) 
Latvia -1.659 -3.100** I(1) -0.808 -2.908** I(1) -1.485 -4.215* I(1) -1.047 -4.043* I(1) -0.226 -3.276** I(1) -1.229 -4.452** I(1) 
Lithuania -1.626 -3.562* I(1) -1.326 -2.681*** I(1) -0.491 -3.709* I(1) -0.593 -3.925* I(1) 0.173 -2.235** I(1) -2.262 -2.685* I(1) 
Luxembourg -0.734 -3.332** I(1) -0.371 -3.223** I(1) -0.759 -4.761* I(1) -0.505 -5.949* I(1) -1.857 -3.879* I(1) -4.624* -2.616* I(0) 
Malta -3.027** -8.526* I(0) -2.952** -9.075* I(0) -2.751 -5.160* I(1) -1.061 -4.698* I(1) -1.993 -4.440* I(1) -3.005** -4.951* I(0) 
Netherlands -2.350 -4.980* I(1) -2.198 -5.957* I(1) -1.086 -4.976* I(1) -1.100 -5.652* I(1) -0.892 -2.967** I(1) 1.121 -5.318* I(1) 
Poland -1.175 -5.451* I(1) 0.791 -3.406* I(1) -4.702* -2.775* I(0) -4.431* -2.631* I(0) 0.224 -6.235* I(1) -1.248 -5.749* I(1) 
Portugal -1.480 -1.392* I(1) -2.379 -2.142* I(1) -3.176** -3.291** I(1) -1.458 -4.110* I(1) -2.481 -2.666*** I(1) -3.444* -0.933 I(0) 
Romania -3.388** -6.660* I(1) -1.747 -6.178* I(1) -9.411* -2.244 I(0) -10.443* -2.351 I(0) 0.291 -2.729*** I(1) -0.982 -3.424** I(1) 
Slovak Republic -2.131 -6.216* I(1) -0.915 -5.506* I(1) -1.017 -3.093* I(1) -1.218 -3.554* I(1) -0.927 -3.209** I(1) 0.413 -4.795* I(1) 
Slovenia -0.567 -2.711*** I(1) -1.563 -5.950* I(1) -0.147 -3.132** I(1) -0.514 -4.118* I(1) -2.531 -2.578** I(1) -0.496 -4.088* I(1) 
Spain 1.102 -3.357** I(1) -1.290 -3.489* I(1) -2.169 -3.914* I(1) -1.120 -4.623* I(1) -1.578 -2.354** I(1) -4.535* -3.056** I(0) 
Sweden 2.895 -2.784*** I(1) -2.985** -4.993* I(0) -1.079 -4.502* I(1) -1.088 -5.746* I(1) -0.850 -4.344 * I(1) -2.320 -2.105** I(1) 
United Kingdom 2.998 -2.690*** I(1) -0.453 -4.410* I(1) -1.199 -4.750* I(1) -0.852 -4.935* I(1) -1.461 -3.509* I(1) -3.206** -2.909** I(0) 
Note: lg is log of gasoline consumption per driver, ld is log of diesel consumption per driver, lpg is log of real price of gasoline, lpd is log of real price of diesel, 
lgdp is log of real GDP per capita, lvt is log of number of vehicles per driver, 1st D. is first difference of the variables and Dec. is decision of the level of 
integration. *, ** and *** denote the significance of the test statistic at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively 
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Table 4: Results of Phillips–Perron unit root test 
  lg ld lpg lpd lgdp Lvt 
Country Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. 
Austria 0.553 -5.083* I(1) -0.600 -5.485* I(1) -1.398 -5.296* I(1) -1.324 -5.273* I(1) -1.998 -5.044* I(1) -3.158** -2.990** I(0) 
Belgium 1.472 -4.139* I(1) -1.460 -5.123* I(1) -1.217 -4.174* I(1) -1.065 -4.818* I(1) -1.902 -4.401* I(1) -6.580* -2.343 I(0) 
Bulgaria -1.296 -7.115* I(1) -1.942 -6.499* I(1) -6.893* -3.103** I(0) -5.596* -3.500* I(0) -0.278 -3.214** I(1) -0.868 -5.506* I(1) 
Croatia -1.661 -3.316** I(1) -0.695 -4.926* I(1) -0.991 -2.397** I(1) -0.812 -1.990** I(1) -2.772*** -3.210** I(0) -0.658 -2.308*** I(1) 
Cyprus -0.548 -2.182** I(1) -2.634*** -5.587* I(1) -1.411 -3.816* I(1) -0.865 -3.199* I(1) -3.721* -3.146** I(0) -0.829 -2.079** I(1) 
Czech Republic -1.029 -8.034* I(1) -1.196 -4.434* I(1) -0.786 -3.517* I(1) -0.573 -4.037* I(1) -0.276 -4.826* I(1) -5.443* -2.484 I(0) 
Denmark -0.615 -2.122** I(1) -2.401 -5.148* I(1) -1.523 -4.099* I(1) -0.537 -4.929* I(1) -2.084 -4.079* I(1) 0.219 -3.325** I(1) 
Estonia -3.777* -4.364* I(0) -1.173 -4.223* I(1) -0.804 -3.605* I(1) -0.377 -3.926* I(1) -1.907 -2.000** I(1) -2.312 -3.288** I(1) 
Finland -1.487 -3.729* I(1) -3.639* -4.626* I(0) -1.393 -4.360* I(1) -1.260 -4.851* I(1) -1.664 -3.530* I(1) 2.023 -4.102* I(1) 
France 2.935 -3.565 ** I(1) -1.640 -3.783* I(1) -1.566 -4.307* I(1) -1.109 -4.627* I(1) -1.851 -3.893* I(1) -1.453 -2.949** I(1) 
Germany 0.973 -3.949* I(1) -2.968** -6.710* I(0) -0.613 -3.550* I(1) -0.356 -4.021* I(1) -1.419 -5.202* I(1) -1.682 -4.167* I(1) 
Greece -1.883 -3.443* I(1) -1.467 -4.921* I(1) -3.083** -3.775* I(0) -1.940 -4.310* I(1) -1.176 -2.460** I(1) -0.277 -5.212* I(1) 
Hungary -2.119 -3.769* I(1) -1.585 -4.740* I(1) -1.114 -5.617* I(1) -1.524 -6.691* I(1) -0.699 -3.185** I(1) -6.131* -4.258* I(0) 
Ireland -1.190 -2.447** I(1) -1.011 -3.629* I(1) -1.506 -4.527* I(1) -1.460 -5.311* I(1) -1.005 -1.758*** I(1) -2.086 -2.891** I(1) 
Italy -0.495 -2.252** I(1) -1.820 -4.671* I(1) -2.381 -4.176* I(1) -1.213 -4.974* I(1) -3.210** -3.341** I(0) -5.476* -3.264** I(0) 
Latvia -1.820 -3.126** I(1) -1.169 -3.065** I(1) -1.390 -4.292* I(1) -0.957 -4.119* I(1) -0.769 -3.262** I(1) -1.226 -4.452* I(1) 
Lithuania -1.707 -3.668* I(1) -1.610 -2.589*** I(1) -0.473 -3.707* I(1) -0.590 -4.016* I(1) -0.360 -2.142** I(1) -6.623* -2.665*** I(0) 
Luxembourg -1.236 -3.367** I(1) -0.546 -3.170** I(1) -1.080 -4.858* I(1) -0.630 -5.931* I(1) -1.580 -3.957* I(1) -3.317** -2.508 I(0) 
Malta -2.953** -9.718* I(0) -3.033** -9.819* I(0) -2.735*** -5.866* I(1) -0.786 -5.172* I(1) -1.672 -4.502* I(1) -3.234** -4.928* I(0) 
Netherlands -2.417 -5.127* I(1) -2.348 -5.954* I(1) -1.185 -4.932* I(1) -1.219 -5.653* I(1) -0.831 -2.925** I(1) 1.441 -5.313* I(1) 
Poland -1.390 -5.580* I(1) 0.354 -3.337** I(1) -4.560* -2.671*** I(0) -4.129* -2.552 I(0) 0.101 -5.716* I(1) -1.206 -5.747* I(1) 
Portugal -1.427 -3.782** I(1) -3.485* -2.032** I(0) -2.800*** -3.268** I(1) -1.589 -4.071* I(1) -1.929 -2.809*** I(1) -3.562* -0.175 I(0) 
Romania -3.338** -6.835* I(1) -1.590 -6.277* I(1) -10.895* -2.381 I(0) -10.297* -2.667*** I(0) -0.434 -2.809*** I(1) -0.887 -3.345** I(1) 
Slovak Republic -2.140 -6.284* I(1) -1.082 -5.521* I(1) -1.245 -3.009** I(1) -1.424 -3.537* I(1) -0.889 -3.215** I(1) 0.580 -4.785* I(1) 
Slovenia -0.990 -2.796** I(1) -1.568 -5.853* I(1) -0.468 -3.108** I(1) -0.580 -4.118* I(1) -2.381 -3.607** I(1) -0.500 -4.034* I(1) 
Spain 0.018 -3.479* I(1) -1.182 -3.654* I(1) -2.140 -3.910** I(1) -1.361 -4.559* I(1) -1.257 -1.848*** I(1) -3.627* -3.079** I(0) 
Sweden 1.553 -2.851*** I(1) -3.122** -5.120* I(0) -1.434 -4.450* I(1) -1.114 -5.807* I(1) -0.842 -4.307* I(1) -2.953* -2.330 I(0) 
United Kingdom 1.472 -2.611*** I(1) -0.652 -4.526* I(1) -1.423 -4.732* I(1) -1.029 -4.917* I(1) -1.284 -3.547* I(1) -2.565 -2.917** I(1) 
Note: lg is log of gasoline consumption per driver, ld is log of diesel consumption per driver, lpg is log of real price of gasoline, lpd is log of real price of diesel, 
lgdp is log of real GDP per capita, lvt is log of number of vehicles per driver, 1st D. is first difference of the variables and Dec. is decision of the level of 
integration. *, ** and *** denote the significance of the test statistic at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively 
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Table 5: Results of Zivot-Andrews endogenous structural break unit root test 
   lg  ld  Lpg  lpd  lgdp  lvt 
Country Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. Level 1st D. Dec. 
Austria -3.084(0) 
1986 
-6.095*(0) 
1993 
I(1) -3.482(2) 
2007 
-7.934*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -3.279(0) 
2004 
-5.768*(0) 
2003 
I(1) -3.821(0) 
2004 
-5.796*(0) 
2003 
I(1) -2.260(2) 
2008 
-6.209*(1) 
2008 
I(1) -4.840**(0) 
2002 
-4.775***(0) 
2001 
I(0) 
Belgium -2.851(0) 
1986 
-5.183**(0) 
1984 
I(1) -4.114(2) 
2006 
-7.753*(0) 
1984 
I(1) -3.751(1) 
2003 
-4.666***(0) 
1986 
I(1) -2.849(0) 
1983 
-5.144**(0) 
1987 
I(1) -2.174(0) 
2008 
-5.876*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -2.514(1) 
1998 
-4.697**(0) 
1986 
I(1) 
Bulgaria -4.953**(0) 
1991 
-6.766*(1) 
1991 
I(0) -4.698*(0) 
1991 
-7.829*(0) 
1991 
I(1) -3.504(0) 
2003 
-15.893*(0) 
1999 
I(1) -3.388(0) 
2003 
 -13.757*(0) 
1999 
I(1) -4.006(1) 
1990 
-5.645*(0) 
1989 
I(1) -8.383*(0) 
2006 
-5.948*(0) 
2008 
I(0) 
Croatia -3.525(2) 
2008 
-5.190**(0) 
1994 
I(1) -1.595(2) 
2009 
-5.593*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -5.277**(1) 
2003 
 -3.148(0) 
1999 
I(0) -5.548*(1) 
2003 
-3.659(0) 
2001 
I(0) -3.177(0) 
2009 
-5.540*(0) 
2009 
I(1) -2.548(2) 
2009 
-4.874**(0) 
1994 
I(1) 
Cyprus -3.755(1) 
1995 
-5.710*(0) 
2003 
I(1)  -2.956(0) 
2001 
-7.187*(0) 
2007 
I(1) -2.725(0) 
2004 
-4.450(0) 
2002 
I(1) -3.499(0) 
2002 
-5.188*(0) 
2001 
I(1) -0.137(0) 
2008 
-5.436*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -3.860(1) 
2004 
-5.062**(0) 
2009 
I(1) 
Czech 
Republic 
-3.103(1) 
1992 
-5.374**(2) 
1997 
I(1) -3.934(2) 
1990 
-6.552*(0) 
1998 
I(1) -3.190(0) 
1997 
 -5.019**(0) 
2009 
I(1) -3.283(0) 
2004 
-5.932*(0) 
2009 
I(1) -2.455(1) 
2004 
-5.937*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -4.912**(1) 
2002 
-5.237**(1) 
2004 
I(0) 
Denmark -1.126(1) 
1990 
-4.646**(0) 
1984 
I(1) -3.617(0) 
1988 
-6.255*(0) 
1984 
I(1) -4.116(1) 
2003 
-6.737*(1) 
1986 
I(1) -3.931(0) 
1983 
-5.955*(0) 
1990 
I(1) -2.759(1) 
2008 
-5.256**(0) 
2008 
I(1) -5.602*(1) 
1990 
-5.851*(2) 
1995 
I(0) 
Estonia -4.142(0) 
1997 
-9.584*(1) 
1996 
I(1) -4.469(0) 
2001 
-6.188*(0) 
1994 
I(1) -6.496*(0) 
2005 
-4.462(0) 
2007 
I(0) -4.281(0) 
2005 
-4.685***(0) 
2007 
I(1) -5.222**(1) 
2009 
-6.379*(1) 
2008 
I(0) -4.549(2) 
2001 
-5.060**(0) 
2003 
I(1) 
Finland -2.592(1) 
1986 
-6.819*(0) 
1990 
I(1) -5.817*(2) 
2000 
 -4.046(1) 
1985 
I(0) -3.611(1) 
2003 
-6.372*(1) 
1987 
I(1) -3.029(0) 
2004 
-5.238**(0) 
1991 
I(1) -2.778(1) 
1998 
-4.849**(0) 
1994 
I(1) -4.801**(0) 
1993 
-5.873*(0) 
1995 
I(0) 
France -3.047(0) 
2003 
-6.188*(0) 
1997 
I(1) -4.766*(1) 
1991 
-3.117(2) 
1989 
I(0) -2.992(0) 
2003 
-5.547*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -3.024(0) 
2003 
-5.459*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -3.362(1) 
2008 
-4.731***(0) 
2008 
I(1) -4.075(1) 
1996 
-4.884*(0) 
2002 
I(1) 
Germany -2.644(0) 
1986 
-5.980*(0) 
2000 
I(1) -5.092**(2) 
1991 
-7.696*(0) 
1984 
I(0) -3.128(0) 
1997 
-5.772*(1) 
2002 
I(1) -3.445(0) 
2003 
-5.225**(0) 
2009 
I(1) -3.840(0) 
1988 
-5.454*(2) 
1993 
I(1) -3.132(0) 
1992 
-4.758***(0) 
1992 
I(1) 
Greece -0.787(2) 
1992 
-5.772*(0) 
1990 
I(1) 0.474(1) 
2007 
-6.557*(0) 
2007 
I(1) -1.908(0) 
2003 
-6.429*(0) 
1986 
I(1) -2.462(0) 
2003 
-6.269*(1) 
1987 
I(1) -2.960(1) 
2000 
-5.350*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -3.391(0) 
1991 
-5.941**(0) 
1998 
I(1) 
Hungary -3.571(1) 
1986 
-5.169**(1) 
1990 
I(1) -3.368(2) 
1991 
-6.145*(0) 
1997 
I(1) -2.686(0) 
1993 
-7.295*(0) 
2002 
I(1) -2.813(0) 
1994 
-7.869*(0) 
2002 
I(1) -5.430*(0) 
2009 
-5.268**(0) 
2007 
I(0) -3.964(0) 
2008 
-7.519*(0) 
2000 
I(1) 
Ireland -3.326(2) 
2007 
-5.086**(0) 
2007 
I(1) -2.653(2) 
2007 
-5.363*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -2.476(0) 
2004 
-5.696*(0) 
20003 
I(1) -3.142(0) 
2004 
-6.491*(0) 
2003 
I(1) -4.726**(1) 
2005 
-3.543(0) 
2001 
I(0) -3.047(0) 
2009 
-4.824***(0) 
2008 
I(1) 
Italy -1.835(2) 
1989 
-5.649*(0) 
1993 
I(1) -2.611(2) 
2001 
-5.562*(0) 
1995 
I(1) -2.854(0) 
2003 
-5.190*(0) 
1986 
I(1) -2.824(0) 
2004 
-5.468*(0) 
1992 
I(1)  -0.813(2) 
2008 
-5.355*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -3.366(0) 
1985 
-6.199*(0) 
1993 
I(1) 
Latvia -2.192(1) 
2003 
 -5.681*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -4.821**(2) 
2000 
-3.382(2) 
1996 
I(0) -4.551(0) 
2005 
-4.755***(0) 
2007 
I(1) -3.988(0) 
2009 
-4.605***(0) 
2007 
I(1) -4.906*(1) 
1992 
-3.930(0) 
1994 
I(0) -2.730(0) 
2009 
-5.938*(0) 
1995 
I(1) 
Lithuania -5.788*(2) 
2006 
-5.319**(2) 
2004 
I(0) -3.195(0) 
2004 
-5.192**(0) 
1995 
I(1) -3.692(0) 
2007 
-5.511**(2) 
2007 
I(1) -4.551(0) 
2009 
-4.944***(0) 
2001 
I(1) -7.718*(1) 
2009 
 -4.664***(0) 
1995 
I(0) -1.665(0) 
1996 
-6.670*(0) 
2001 
I(1) 
Luxembourg -2.548(1) 
1989 
-5.237**(0) 
1989 
I(1) -5.010***(1) 
2003 
-4.197(0) 
2006 
I(0)  -5.053**(1) 
2003 
 -6.086*(0) 
1986 
I(0) -2.931(0) 
2003 
-7.006*(0) 
1987 
I(1) -1.934(0) 
2008 
-5.379*(0) 
1984 
I(1)  0.155(0) 
2008 
-7.569*(2) 
1999 
I(1) 
Malta -5.680*(0) 
1986 
-9.653*(0) 
1986 
I(0) -7.435*(0) 
1986 
-5.468*(2) 
1986 
I(0) -6.089*(0) 
2003 
-5.628*(0) 
2004 
I(0) -4.481(0) 
2005 
-5.918*(0) 
2004 
I(1) -2.364(1) 
1988 
-6.061***(0) 
2001 
I(1) -6.992*(2) 
1997 
-8.570*(0) 
1996 
I(0) 
Netherlands -4.102(0) -7.003*(1) I(1) -3.821(0) -7.283*(0) I(1) -3.539(1) -5.315**(0) I(1) -2.841(0) -5.989*(0) I(1) -3.323(1) -4.983*(1) I(1) -3.405(0) -6.479*(0) I(1) 
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1993 1989 1999 1984 1997 1986 1983 1997 2008 2001 1991 1993 
Poland -3.174(2) 
1991 
-4.863**(2) 
2000 
I(1) -4.907**(1) 
1989 
-4.055(0) 
1995 
I(0) -6.208(2) 
2000 
-5.524*(0) 
1991 
I(1) -6.344*(2) 
2000 
-5.168**(0) 
1991 
I(0) -2.233(1) 
1995 
-6.764*(0) 
2004 
I(1) -7.613*(0) 
2007 
-6.457*(0) 
2006 
I(0) 
Portugal -0.877(1) 
1987 
-5.499*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -0.546(1) 
2006 
-4.510**(0) 
1987 
I(1) -3.396(1) 
2003 
-5.348**(0) 
1985 
I(1) -3.171(0) 
2003 
-4.848**(0) 
2003 
I(1) -2.716(1) 
2008 
-4.799**(0) 
1995 
I(1) -0.742(2) 
2007 
-4.473**(0) 
1999 
I(1) 
Romania -4.298(0) 
2001 
-7.050*(0) 
1987 
I(1) -3.057(0) 
2006 
-6.237*(2) 
2003 
I(1) -3.674(2) 
1999 
-4.696**(2) 
2006 
I(1) -6.248*(0) 
2004 
-4.098(0) 
1995 
I(0) -3.470(1) 
1989 
-4.413***(2) 
2007 
I(1) -3.496(1) 
2002 
-4.834**(0) 
2007 
I(1) 
Slovak 
Republic 
-5.201**(0) 
1983 
-6.556*(0) 
1992 
I(0) -3.272(0) 
1991 
 -6.538*(0) 
1991 
I(1) -3.018(0) 
2004 
-4.918**(0) 
2003 
I(1) -3.239(0) 
1999 
 -5.224**(0) 
2003 
I(1) -3.169(1) 
2006 
-4.653***(0) 
2009 
I(1) -2.601(0) 
2008 
-6.250*(0) 
2006 
I(1) 
Slovenia -4.003(0) 
1993 
-6.156*(0) 
1997 
I(1) -3.688(2) 
2009 
-6.540*(0) 
1998 
I(1) -2.321(0) 
1999 
-5.279**(0) 
2007 
I(1) -2.642(0) 
2000 
-5.264**(0) 
2007 
I(1) -3.126(0) 
2009 
-7.974*(0) 
2009 
I(1) -3.286(0) 
1995 
-4.968**(0) 
1990 
I(1) 
Spain -2.360(2) 
1986 
-4.885**(1) 
1986 
I(1) -4.874**(1) 
2006 
-3.829(2) 
2006 
I(0)  -2.463(0) 
2003 
-4.915**(0) 
1986 
I(1) -2.818(0) 
2003 
-5.629*(1) 
1993 
I(1) -4.982*(1) 
2007 
-3.866(0) 
2008 
I(0) -0.955(0) 
1987 
-4.859**(0) 
1987 
I(1) 
Sweden 0.324(0) 
2007 
-4.911**(0) 
1984 
I(1) -4.615*(2) 
1987 
-7.927*(0) 
1985 
I(1) -2.851(0) 
1983 
-4.906**(0) 
1985 
I(1) -3.557(0) 
1983 
-5.842*(0) 
2003 
I(1) -3.045(1) 
1999 
-5.397*(0) 
1994 
I(1) -4.218***(1) 
1989 
 -3.547(1) 
1990 
I(0) 
United 
Kingdom 
-1.629(0) 
1986 
-5.810*(0) 
1984 
I(1) -5.616(1) 
2007 
 -6.780*(0) 
1984 
I(1) -4.361(0) 
1983 
-5.101**(0) 
2008 
I(1) -3.824(0) 
1983 
-5.603*(0) 
2008 
I(1) -4.456(1) 
2008 
-4.724**(0) 
1984 
I(1) -1.332(0) 
2006 
-4.685***(0) 
2006 
I(1) 
Note: lg is log of gasoline consumption per driver, ld is log of diesel consumption per driver, lpg is log of real price of gasoline, lpd is log of real price of diesel, 
lgdp is log of real GDP per capita, lvt is log of number of vehicles per driver, 1st D. is first difference of the variables and Dec. is decision of the level of 
integration. *, ** and *** denote the significance of the test statistic at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively. Lag order is given in parentheses and the break year is 
given below each test statistic  
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The actual time of the structural breaks in the data set is determined using the Bai-Perron test (Perron, 
2006). The Bai-Perron test provides a flexible approach to determining multiple structural breaks at 
unknown dates. Once the break points are determined, it is accounted for in the model using impulse 
dummies. The variant types of the Bai-Perron tests sometimes select several different break points. In 
this case impulse dummies are included in the initial estimation for all the break points, both individually 
and in a group, and their significance and their effect on the models properties are compared. Only 
those that are considered important are included in the final estimation.  
The appropriate lag lengths of 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗∗  in the estimation of Eq. (1) are then selected using Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC), while controlling for serial correlation with the 
inclusion of dummies, a trend and a constant. The selected model is then estimated on the log of the 
variables, which allows the estimated coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. Once an appropriate 
model is selected and estimated, its stability is checked using the cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
(CUSUM) and CUSUM of squares (CUSUMSQ) plots. In addition serial correlation in the models is 
checked using the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test (LM) (Greene, 2003). Details of the 
estimation results showing the selected model, cointegrating coefficient, Bounds test, LM test, and 
stability tests are provided in the Appendix.  
5. Results and discussion   
Table 6 presents the price and income elasticities from the estimation results of gasoline and diesel 
demand for each of the EU-28 countries. The estimation results of gasoline demand have the expected 
negative sign for the long-run and short-run price elasticities of all countries. The estimated short-run 
and long-run income elasticities of gasoline demand also have the expected positive sign, except for the 
long-run income elasticities of Belgium and Malta. Likewise, the estimated price elasticities of diesel 
demand have the expected negative sign for both the short-run and long-run estimates of all countries, 
except for the short-run price elasticity of Poland. The estimated long-run and short-run income 
elasticities of diesel demand have the expected positive sign, except for the short-run income elasticities 
of Malta and Slovenia.  
As the results in Table 6 show, the estimated short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is significant 
for 18 countries and the long-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is significant for 15 countries. The 
short-run income elasticity of gasoline demand is significant for 16 countries and the long-run income 
elasticity of gasoline demand is also significant for 16 countries. The estimated short-run price elasticity 
of diesel demand is significant for 14 countries and the long-run price elasticity of diesel demand is 
significant for 11 countries. The short-run income elasticity of diesel demand is significant for 18 
countries and the long-run income elasticity of diesel demand is significant for 11 countries.  
The adjustment factors of both gasoline and diesel demands captured by the cointegrating coefficient 
from the estimations are between 0 and -1, and significant for all countries except in the diesel demand 
estimation of Malta. The average adjustment factor of gasoline demand is -0.4, with the smallest being -
0.01 in Cyprus and the largest -0.99 in Latvia. For the diesel demand, the average adjustment factor is -
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0.48; the smallest adjustment factor is -0.11 for France and the largest is -0.91 for Latvia. This means 
that whenever there is a shock, gasoline demand adjusts on average by 40 % per period and diesel 
demand adjusts by 48 % per period towards long-run equilibrium. The adjustments are in opposite 
directions to the shock, i.e. negative if the shock is positive and positive if the shock is negative. The 
adjustment factor estimates asserted the theoretical stance that fuel demand gradually adjusts towards 
the long-run equilibrium.  
In the estimated demands, the existence of a long-run relationship is tested using the Bounds test. As 
shown in Table 6 and the model summary in the Appendix, the Bounds test of long-run cointegration of 
gasoline demand shows that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between gasoline consumption, 
gasoline price, income and number of vehicles for all of the EU-28 countries except Cyprus, Estonia, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia. The same test for diesel demand shows that there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between diesel consumption, diesel price, income and number of vehicles for 18 of the EU-
28 countries. The selected models of each country for both fuel types pass the LM test of serial 
correlation, except for the gasoline demand of Malta and the diesel demand of Romania and Slovenia. 
The estimated gasoline demand for Malta and diesel demand for Romania and Slovenia could not be 
cleared of serial correlation because the limited number of observations did not allow sufficient 
flexibility in selecting the optimal lag orders in the estimated models. In addition, stability tests using 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ that are shown in the Appendix reveal that all the estimated models free from 
serial correlation are stable. Thus the long-run elasticities of countries where the Bounds test shows a 
long-run relationship can be used for policy analysis and forecasting.  
The reviews of Basso and Oum (2007), Brons et al. (2008) and Dahl (2012) show the average price 
elasticities of gasoline demand to be close to -0.20 in the short run and 1.0 in the long run. In this study 
the estimated average gasoline price elasticity among the EU-28 countries is -0.17 in the short run and -
0.72 in the long run. The main reason for the lower average price elasticity of gasoline demand is the 
consideration of the number of vehicles and demographic effects (Basso and Oum, 2007; Pock, 2010).  
In line with the consensus in the existing literature, the long-run price elasticities of gasoline demand are 
found to be higher than the short-run price elasticities for all countries in absolute values. As the long-
run elasticities depend on the adjustment factor, they are found to be higher than the corresponding 
short-run elasticities because the estimated adjustment factor is between 0 and -1 as expected. The 
short-run price elasticity varies from -0.005 in Spain to -0.58 in Romania. The smallest long-run price 
elasticity of gasoline demand in absolute values is found to be for Malta at 0.04 and the largest is for 
Sweden at 1.96. However the estimation result of gasoline demand for Malta has a serial correlation 
problem and hence it is excluded from the analysis. The long-run price elasticity of gasoline demand 
show a greater variation between countries than the short-run price elasticities.  
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Table 6: Estimated elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand 
 
Gasoline demand 
 
Diesel demand  
Price elasticity Income elasticity Price elasticity Income elasticity  
Country  Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Austriaa,b,c,d 
-0.150** 
(0.068) 
-0.414* 
(0.214) 
0.221  
(0.357) 
0.560  
(0.873) 
-0.060  
(0.067) 
-0.961  
(0.696) 
0.213  
(0.531) 
1.937** 
(0.874) 
Belgiuma,b,c,d 
-0.233** 
(0.092) 
-1.705** 
(0.615) 
0.292  
(0.546) 
-0.121*** 
(0.029) 
-0.082* 
(0.045) 
-0.095* 
(0.053) 
0.852* 
(0.467) 
0.060*** 
(0.005) 
Bulgariaa,b,c,d 
-0.074  
(0.066) 
-0.174  
(0.214) 
0.078 
(0.302) 
0.108*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019  
(0.023) 
-0.017  
(0.025) 
0.207  
(0.304) 
0.80*** 
(0.110) 
Croatiaa,c,d  
-0.343*** 
(0.082) 
-1.085*** 
(0.291) 
0.621** 
(0.265) 
1.745** 
(0.797) 
-0.168  
(0.148) 
-0.507  
(0.558) 
0.80*  
(0.365) 
1.960  
(1.668) 
Cyprusc,d  
-0.027  
(0.062) 
-1.937 
(30.860) 
0.063  
(0.191) 
0.553  
(4.363) 
-0.067  
(0.044) 
-0.158  
(0.251) 
0.393  
(0.584) 
0.273*** 
(0.035) 
Czech 
Republica,c,d 
-0.279** 
(0.104) 
-0.547** 
(0.201) 
0.874** 
(0.401) 
2.225** 
(0.998) 
-0.10  
(0.085) 
-3.214 
(13.833) 
0.997* 
(0.430) 
0.508  
(2.111) 
Denmarka,c,d  
-0.109*** 
(0.026) 
-0.952* 
(0.479) 
0.254 
(0.161) 
3.424*** 
(0.938) 
-0.044  
(0.066) 
-0.422  
(0.579) 
0.227  
(0.449) 
1.272  
(6.354) 
Estoniac,d  
-0.093  
(0.066) 
-0.115  
(0.224) 
0.519*** 
(0.129) 
1.174  
(0.649) 
-0.027  
(0.099) 
-0.133  
(0.308) 
0.650** 
(0.184) 
0.830  
(0.510) 
Finlanda,b,c,d  
-0.101** 
(0.039) 
-0.763*** 
(0.180) 
0.336** 
(0.124) 
1.421** 
(0.599) 
-0.062** 
(0.025) 
-0.30*** 
(0.053) 
0.362*** 
(0.084) 
0.104*** 
(0.028) 
Francea,b,c,d  
-0.174*** 
(0.026) 
-0.624*** 
(0.078) 
0.456** 
(0.174) 
1.222* 
(0.605) 
-0.071* 
(0.038) 
-0.280** 
(0.126) 
0.017  
(0.279) 
1.398** 
(0.622) 
Germanya,b,c,d 
-0.042  
(0.043) 
-1.165  
(2.310) 
0.456** 
(0.218) 
6.494 
(11.926) 
-0.160** 
(0.070) 
-0.270** 
(0.096) 
0.503 
(0.314) 
0.371  
(0.585) 
Greecea,b,c,d 
-0.126*** 
(0.019) 
-0.289*** 
(0.041) 
0.423*** 
(0.087) 
0.946*** 
(0.282) 
-0.120*** 
(0.039) 
-0.231*** 
(0.021) 
0.682*** 
(0.211) 
0.704*** 
(0.153) 
Hungarya,b,c,d 
-0.106** 
(0.048) 
-0.128  
(0.113) 
0.412** 
(0.178) 
1.150** 
(0.552) 
-0.237*** 
(0.061) 
-1.0  
(1.329) 
1.083*** 
(0.292) 
5.723  
(3.914) 
Irelanda,c,d 
-0.032 
‘(0.043) 
-0.217  
(0.181) 
0.520** 
(0.181) 
1.028** 
(0.459) 
-0.087  
(0.053) 
-0.147** 
(0.065) 
0.286  
(0.204) 
0.300*** 
(0.069) 
Italya,b,c,d 
-0.125** 
(0.059) 
-0.359** 
(0.131) 
0.485  
(0.312) 
1.329  
(1.280) 
-0.056** 
(0.018) 
-0.725* 
(0.322) 
0.917*** 
(0.140) 
4.938** 
(1.647) 
Latviaa,b,c,d  
-0.358** 
(0.063) 
-0.468  
(0.239) 
0.761*** 
(0.117) 
1.520** 
(0.270) 
-0.387** 
(0.110) 
-0.479* 
(0.230) 
1.320*** 
(0.207) 
1.572*** 
(0.316) 
Lithuaniaa,b,c,d  
-0.475** 
(0.187) 
-1.362** 
(0.595) 
1.320* 
(0.154) 
4.044* 
(1.907) 
-0.681*** 
(0.104) 
-0.829*** 
(0.213) 
0.735*** 
(0.155) 
1.648** 
(0.518) 
Luxembourga,b,c,d 
-0.248*** 
(0.074) 
-0.260  
(0.216) 
0.883*** 
(0.212) 
3.060*** 
(0.889) 
-0.056  
(0.064) 
-1.004** 
(0.400) 
0.152  
(0.258) 
0.540  
(0.799) 
Maltaa,d 
-0.010  
(0.023) 
-0.046  
(0.135) 
0.897** 
(0.217) 
-4.366  
(2.623) 
-0.095  
(0.191) 
-0.115  
(0.221) 
-0.096  
(0.740) 
0.447  
(1.417) 
Netherlandsb,c,d 
-0.061* 
(0.027) 
-0.507  
(1.059) 
0.347** 
(0.109) 
0.0728 
(0.768) 
-0.035  
(0.080) 
-0.301  
(0.341) 
1.270** 
(0.568) 
1.494  
(1.454) 
Polanda,c,d 
-0.178*** 
(0.053) 
-0.262*** 
(0.026) 
0.384  
(0.302) 
0.539  
(0.379) 
0.122* 
(0.060) 
-0.051  
(0.098) 
0.927** 
(0.405) 
0.333  
(0.414) 
Portugala,b,c,d 
-0.029  
(0.049) 
-0.940  
(1.026) 
0.473** 
(0.217) 
4.850  
(5.070) 
-0.115** 
(0.050) 
-0.186  
(0.228) 
0.922*** 
(0.214) 
2.278  
(1.688) 
Romaniaa,c 
-0.581*** 
(0.068) 
-0.90*  
(0.454) 
0.603** 
(0.233) 
1.358* 
(0.618) 
-0.460** 
(0.115) 
-0.207  
(0.693) 
1.30** 
(0.374) 
0.372  
(1.588) 
Slovakiab,c,d -0.430*** -0.509*** 0.407  0.538** -0.048  -0.105  0.870** 1.841  
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(0.136) (0.092) (0.322) (0.201) (0.113) (0.370) (0.310) (1.427) 
Sloveniaa,c 
-0.186  
(0.107) 
-0.317  
(0.200) 
0.561  
(0.329) 
0.561  
(0.666) 
-0.059  
(0.129) 
-0.430  
(3.036) 
-0.055  
(0.358) 
1.155  
(2.362) 
Spaina,b,c,d 
-0.010  
(0.063) 
-1.854** 
(0.809) 
0.018  
(0.407) 
0.364*** 
(0.105) 
-0.142* 
(0.064) 
-1.127  
(1.037) 
1.344** 
(0.543) 
3.479  
(2.497) 
Swedena,b,c,d 
-0.154*** 
(0.033) 
-1.965  
(3.538) 
0.048  
(0.189) 
4.220  
(7.996) 
-0.073  
(0.043) 
-0.121* 
(0.069) 
0.685** 
(0.301) 
0.101  
(0.215) 
United 
Kingdoma,b,c,d 
-0.013  
(0.040) 
-0.466** 
(0.160) 
0.067  
(0.248) 
0.439  
(1.376) 
-0.074* 
(0.036) 
-0.465  
(0.699) 
0.834*** 
(0.215) 
1.715  
(2.673) 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively   
- a and b indicate that the Bounds test confirms there is a long-run cointegration in the gasoline 
and diesel demand estimation respectively 
- c indicates stability and no serial correlation in gasoline demand estimation  
- d indicates stability and no serial correlation in diesel demand estimation 
- standard errors are in parentheses   
The short-run income elasticity of gasoline demand varies from the smallest estimate of 0.018 in Spain 
to the largest estimate of 1.32 in Lithuania. The long-run income elasticity of gasoline demand ranges 
from the least estimated value of -0.12 in Belgium to the highest value of 6.49 in Germany, with a higher 
variation than their short-run counterparts. The average estimated income elasticity of gasoline demand 
in this study is 0.45 in the short run and 1.44 in the long run, which is not considerably different from 
the literature reviewed by Ajanovic et al. (2012).  
The long-run income elasticities are higher than the short-run elasticities because of the adjustment 
coefficient. In addition, the long-run income elasticity estimates of gasoline demand have higher 
variation between countries than the short-run estimates. The elasticity variations between the 
countries shows that using the same elasticity across several countries for policy analysis is likely to 
result in biased outcomes. The bias is likely to become higher in the long run because of the higher 
variations in the long-run estimates. Moreover, in absolute values, both average short-run and long-run 
income elasticities of gasoline demand are higher than the respective price elasticities. This shows that 
on average gasoline demand is more income sensitive than price.     
In the estimated short-run price elasticity of diesel demand, in absolute values Bulgaria has the lowest at 
0.020 and the highest estimate is 0.68 for Lithuania. The estimated short-run price elasticity of diesel 
demand is relatively concentrated around -0.14, with 23 countries falling in the range of -0.02 to -0.4. 
Overall the short-run price elasticity of diesel demand vary slightly less than the short-run price elasticity 
of gasoline demand. As a result of the estimated adjustment factors being within the expected range, 
the entire long-run price elasticity estimates of diesel demand are higher in absolute values than their 
short-run counterparts except for Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. The long-run price elasticity of diesel 
demand has larger variation than the gasoline counterparts. The lowest estimated long-run price 
elasticity of diesel demand, in absolute values, is for Bulgaria at 0.017 and the highest is for the Czech 
Republic at 3.21. The average estimated short-run and long-run price elasticities of diesel demand (-0.13 
and -0.49 respectively) are lower than the average of the studies reviewed by Brons et al. (2008). The 
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likely reason for the lower estimates is the consideration of the number of vehicles and demographic 
effect in the estimation (Pock, 2010).  
The short-run income elasticity of diesel demand varies more than the short-run income elasticity of 
gasoline demand. The long-run income elasticity of gasoline demand has a larger variation than the 
long-run income elasticity of diesel. The lowest short-run income elasticity of diesel demand estimated 
is for Malta at -0.096 and the highest is for Spain at 1.34. The short-run elasticities are concentrated 
around 0.5 and 1.0, with 13 countries falling within the range of 0.2 to 0.8. The long-run income 
elasticities of diesel are between 0.05 for Belgium and 5.72 for Hungary. They are highly concentrated 
around 1.2 and the estimates of 15 countries are between 0.5 and 2.0. The average estimated income 
elasticities of diesel demand are 0.65 in the short run and 1.36 in the long run. The average short-run 
elasticity is higher than the average of the studies reviewed by Ajanovic et al. (2012) but the long-run 
estimates are equal. In addition both the average short-run and long-run income elasticities of diesel 
demand are higher than the average short-run and long-run price elasticities in absolute values. Thus 
diesel demand is more income elastic than price elastic. Moreover, both average long-run income and 
price elasticities of diesel demand are less elastic than their gasoline counterparts, indicating that a 
policy affecting both gasoline and diesel would have a higher impact on average on gasoline than on 
diesel in the long run.  
A simple line plot of elasticities against average per capita incomes during the sample period is shown in 
Figure 3. Table 7 provides calculated correlation coefficients. In contrast to the study by Dahl (2012), 
Figure 3 and Table 7 do not indicate any strong systematic relationship between the level of average per 
capita GDP and estimated elasticities. However, while all of the estimated long-run elasticities vary 
unsystematically between countries, the short-run elasticities show a general downward trend as 
income increases. In particular, the short-run price elasticity of diesel is relatively high for an average 
income of less than 6,000 USD per year during the whole sample period, and has a general downward 
trend for higher income countries. The top ten countries with an average per capita income above 
29,000 USD per year have relatively low income elasticities of gasoline demand in the short run.  
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Figure 3: Elasticities and GDP per capita for different countries  
 
 
Table 7: Correlation between elasticities, in absolute values, and average GDP per capita  
  
Gasoline Diesel 
Price elasticity Income elasticity  Price elasticity Income elasticity  
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Av. GDP Per Capita -0.358 0.149 -0.243 0.164 -0.429 -0.025 -0.340 -0.142 
 
6. Fuel tax implications in relation to the EU 2030 emission goal 
The European Commission (2014) reports that between 1990 and 2007, greenhouse gas emissions has 
increased by 33 %, with this trend expected to continue in the following decades. In an effort to halt the 
continuous rise in emissions, the EU has set a goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fuel 
consumption in the transport sector by about 20 % by 2030 compared to emissions in 2008. In order to 
achieve this goal, a minimum fuel tax has been set. The European Commission (2014) analysis shows 
that EU emission targets lead to a significant reduction in air pollution. The economic valuation of 
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different scenarios by the report estimates that reduced mortality and better health from lower 
pollution rates has an estimated value of € 2.9 to € 35.5 billion.  
The 2003 EU Energy Tax Directive put forward a minimum tax level on gasoline and diesel for road 
transport in each EU member country, which has applied since 2013. However the directive bans tax on 
international aviation and shipping. The minimum tax rate imposed is € 0.359/liter on gasoline and 
€0.330/liter on diesel (Directive, 2003). It corresponds to 48 % of the average EU member countries’ tax 
on diesel and 43 % of the average EU member countries’ tax on gasoline in 2013. There is an ongoing 
discussion and proposal to raise the minimum tax rate and also introduce tax in the excluded sectors. 
The implication of a minimum tax rate on total fuel consumption and emissions is determined by, 
among other things, how consumers in each country respond. An examination follows of whether the 
current tax scheme is sufficient to reach the EU’s 2030 goals using the elasticity estimates in Section 5. 
For the countries where the Bounds test did not confirm the existence of a long-run relationship and the 
estimated models were not free from serial correlation, the average EU long-run elasticity is used to 
project their fuel demand response to varying tax levels.  
For the purposes of simplicity, it is assumed that the EU’s goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
the transport sector translates to reducing emissions from gasoline and diesel by 20 % each in 2030 
compared to emissions in 2008. Emissions from gasoline and diesel are calculated from their respective 
consumption using “Government emission conversion factors for greenhouse gas company reporting” 
(2016). 
In order to examine whether the EU’s 2030 goal could be reached with the current trends, projected 
emissions in 2030 were calculated. The projected emission level from gasoline and diesel consumption 
in 2030 in the transport sector is calculated using the projected annual percentage change of emission 
from energy consumption in the transport sector from Capros et al. (2016). The basic assumption behind 
the projections of Capros et al. (2016) is that the EU and member states would implement agreed 
policies by December 2014 and that the 2020 targets of greenhouse gas emission and renewable energy 
sources would be achieved. The projection takes into account population growth, GDP growth, 
technology development and recent developments in fuel prices.  
When it is assumed that each country is expected to achieve the 2030 target independently then, as 
shown in Table 8, the projected 2030 emissions level from gasoline consumption in 17 countries and all 
of the EU-28 countries’ projected emissions from diesel consumption are higher than the target. Also, 
when it is assumed that the EU-28 countries are expected to achieve the 2030 goal collectively, then the 
last row of Table 8 shows that the projected 2030 emission from gasoline and diesel consumption would 
be higher than the targets. Consequently, the required percentage change in price in the form of a tax 
increment in order to reach the 2030 emission goal is calculated from: 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2030 ∗ �1 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝜖𝜖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗� = 80%𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2008 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 = 80%𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2008 − 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2030𝜖𝜖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2030  
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where 𝜖𝜖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗  is long-run price elasticity of j=1 (gasoline), 2 (diesel) for the 28 EU countries 𝑒𝑒 =1,2, … ,28, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗  is the required percentage change in price in the form of a tax increment. 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2008 and 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒,𝑗𝑗,2030 are fuel demands in 2008 and 2030 respectively. 
 
Table 8: Projected emissions, targets, and required tax increment to achieve the EU’s 2030 emission 
goals 
Country 
Projected annual 
% change 2030 targets 
2030 
gasoline 
emission 
million tons 
CO2e 
2030 diesel 
emission 
million tons 
CO2e 
Required 
gasoline 
price change 
in the form 
of tax 
increase 
Required 
diesel price 
change in 
the form of 
tax increase 
2010 to 
2020 
2020 to 
2030 
80 % of 2008 
gasoline 
emission 
million tons 
CO2e 
80 % of 
2008 diesel 
emission 
million tons 
CO2e 
Austria -0.52 -0.55 4.37 13.17 4.82 14.90 22 % 12 % 
Belgium -1.17 0.37 3.50 18.36 3.38 21.19 - 141 % 
Bulgaria 0.09 0.27 1.49 3.89 1.88 4.71 118 % 35 % 
Croatia -0.80 -0.05 1.69 3.02 1.83 3.40 7 % 23 % 
Cyprus -1.13 0.33 0.93 0.84 1.12 0.97 24 % 26 % 
Czech Republic -0.35 0.15 5.03 9.35 5.41 10.60 13 % 24 % 
Denmark -1.33 -0.27 4.25 6.82 4.00 7.04 - 6 % 
Estonia -0.62 -0.32 0.80 1.11 0.78 1.29 - 28 % 
Finland -0.74 -0.92 3.94 5.87 3.94 6.41 0.15 % 29 % 
France -0.08 -0.36 20.61 77.35 21.92 94.38 10 % 65 % 
Germany -0.40 -1.02 49.80 66.89 49.07 76.63 - 47 % 
Greece -1.38 -0.82 10.07 6.36 9.20 6.84 - 30 % 
Hungary -0.95 0.47 3.73 6.66 3.82 7.30 18 % 9 % 
Ireland -0.11 0.60 4.26 6.53 4.70 7.44 43 % 25 % 
Italy -0.86 -0.55 27.20 61.23 26.48 61.63 - 1 % 
Latvia -0.64 0.15 0.92 1.90 0.83 2.17 - 26 % 
Lithuania 0.24 -0.45 1.02 2.55 0.85 2.88 - 14 % 
Luxembourg 0.21 0.72 1.02 4.41 1.20 6.06 56 % 27 % 
Malta 0.32 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.34 36 % 45 % 
Netherlands -0.77 -0.75 10.37 17.26 10.60 18.16 3 % 16 % 
Poland 1.07 0.34 9.97 21.26 14.18 34.49 113 % 77 % 
Portugal -1.06 0.13 3.72 11.24 3.92 12.44 6 % 52 % 
Romania 0.41 0.99 3.62 8.14 4.88 11.34 36 % 57 % 
Slovakia 0.06 0.59 1.62 3.28 1.91 4.81 21 % 303 % 
Slovenia -0.03 -0.62 1.61 3.255 1.68 3.256 13 % 0.1 % 
Spain -1.01 0.14 15.34 67.09 15.19 68.79 - 2 % 
Sweden -1.56 -0.81 8.40 8.70 7.61 8.94 - 22 % 
United 
Kingdom -0.60 -0.75 41.30 55.85 39.78 61.48 - 20 % 
EU-28  -0.52 -0.38 240.75 492.62 247.97 556.20 4 % 23 % 
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The required tax increments are calculated using long-run price elasticities, therefore the tax change 
needs to be implemented well ahead of the target so that the full long-run effect materializes by 2030. 
When it was assumed that the EU-28 countries are expected to achieve the target independently, the 
required tax increment varies highly between countries for both fuel types. To keep the emissions close 
to the target level, the gasoline price needs to increase by at least 0.15 % in Finland or by a maximum of 
113 % in Poland, and the range of diesel price increases is from 0.1 % in Slovenia to 303 % in Slovakia.  
When it was assumed that the EU-28 countries are expected to achieve the goal collectively, the 
required tax increment is 4 % on gasoline and 23 % on diesel in all of the EU-28 countries. This 
corresponds to a rise in the minimum tax rate by € 0.0144/liter on gasoline and € 0.0759/liter on diesel.   
As shown by the wide variation in the required tax increase between countries, if the EU were able to 
increase the minimum tax rate for individual countries separately, it would have highly varying effects 
on each country in terms of tax revenue and change in consumer surplus. However, the EU can only 
control the common minimum tax rate. Countries that require a high tax increase would be able to 
avoid loss in consumer surplus while the EU collectively achieves its 2030 goal.  
7. Conclusions  
The review in this study showed that gasoline and diesel demand studies cover multiple theoretical and 
empirical frameworks. However, a majority of the studies have been based on the premise that fuel 
demand follows a partial adjustment structure, where it is assumed that demand converges to a long-
run equilibrium. In this framework, whenever a shock happens, demand is assumed to adjust slowly 
over time towards the long-run equilibrium. Several studies within this framework have used time series 
data for a single country or panel data for multiple countries that are usually part of an economic 
alliance such as the OECD. The distribution of studies between the two fuels is disproportionally 
weighted towards gasoline. The general consensus among fuel demand studies is that both long-run 
price elasticities and long-run income elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand are more elastic than 
their short-run counterparts. The average of most studies’ estimated short-run price elasticity is close to 
0.2 and long-run elasticity is close to unity (Brons et al., 2008).  
Literature review studies have shown that elasticity estimates across gasoline and diesel demand studies 
vary based on the underlying model, estimation technique, data type, study area and number of 
exogenous factors considered in the study (Basso and Oum, 2007). When these varying elasticities are 
used for analyses, they will give results that differ because of the dissimilarities between the elasticities. 
Gasoline and diesel demand elasticities that are consistent in terms of estimation methodology are 
needed to analyze and forecast the effects of EU-level fuel policy across each member state. However, 
no study has estimated such elasticities. The present study set out to address this literature gap and 
provide comparable gasoline and diesel demand elasticities across the EU-28 that will eliminate the 
dissimilarities. To this end, short-run and long-run price and income elasticities of gasoline and diesel 
demand are estimated using the ARDL Bounds testing approach of Pesaran et al. (2001). For the 
estimation of each country’s elasticities, a time series data on gasoline and diesel consumption and 
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price, number of vehicles and population is used. There are caveats in relation to the differences in data 
availability between the countries. The time length of the data for some countries is longer than others. 
Due to a lack of sufficient data, the number of vehicles in the estimation is not disaggregated to diesel 
and gasoline-powered vehicles. Therefore it is not possible to observe fuel-switching behavior from the 
estimation. Due to a multicollinearity problem in some countries, the diesel price is not included in the 
estimation of gasoline demand and vice versa. Even though this does not compromise the robustness of 
the estimation, it is not possible to infer cross-price elasticities (Dahl, 2012).  
The result of the estimation shows that elasticities vary considerably between the EU-28 countries. The 
variation in the estimated elasticities ranges from -0.005 to 6.49. The average short-run price elasticity 
of gasoline is estimated to be -0.17 and the long-run is -0.73. The short-run income elasticity of gasoline 
demand is estimated to be 0.46 and the long-run is 1.45. The average estimated short-run price 
elasticity of diesel demand is -0.13 and the long-run is -0.5. The average short-run income elasticity of 
diesel demand is more elastic than the average short-run income elasticity of gasoline demand. 
However, the average long-run income elasticity of diesel demand is less elastic than the average long-
run income elasticity of gasoline demand. The average short-run income elasticity of diesel demand is 
0.66 and the average long-run income elasticity is 1.36.  
Both short-run and long-run income elasticities of gasoline and diesel demand are found to be more 
elastic than their price equivalents. This implies that if a policy intends to decrease emissions by 
increasing price, then price needs to rise faster than income, which is in line with the findings of Graham 
& Glaister (2002, 2004). Moreover, the variation in elasticities between countries did not show any 
strong systematic relationship with income. This is in contrast to the argument of Dahl (2012), but in line 
with the findings of Goodwin et al. (2004), who were also not able to formulate a systematic pattern to 
explain the variations.  
Using the estimated elasticities, the final section evaluated the achievability of the EU’s 2030 
environmental goal of emission reduction from the transport sector. Each country’s demand 
characteristics are reflected in the estimated elasticity and different tax levels for each country would be 
required to achieve the environmental goals. However this approach is not practical on an EU level and 
the goal can be achieved by raising the common minimum tax rate on gasoline and diesel. Differences in 
the countries’ demand characteristics imply that imposing a common tax would benefit some countries 
more than others. The analysis of the EU’s long-term transport emission reduction targets using the 
estimated long-run elasticities shows that there is no guarantee that the goal will be achieved with the 
current tax level, and thus a more stringent fuel tax policy is required.  
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Selected model, cointegration test and serial correlation test  
Table 9: Gasoline demand estimation   
Country 
Selected Model  
(lg lpg lgdp lvt) 
Cointegrating 
coefficient Break Years 
Bounds test 
LM(1) 
Test statistic 
value 
Critical value bounds 
10% 5% 1% 
F-statistic I0 I1 I0 I1 I0 I1 
Austria ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0) -0.41* (0.099) 1992, 2008 4.338** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.904 
Belgium ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4) -0.4* (0.06) 1986, 1989, 1996, 2007 5.225* 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 1.451 
Bulgaria ARDL(4, 2, 0) -0.701* (0.168) - 5.197** 2.17 3.19 2.72 3.83 3.88 5.3 0.037 
Croatia ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.38* (0.102) 2008 5.975* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.502 
Cyprus ARDL(1, 0, 0, 1) -0.01** (0.004) 1984, 2000, 2004, 2008 1.989 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 0.376 
Czech Republic ARDL(1, 0, 1, 0) -0.52* (0.11) 2003 5.431* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.654 
Denmark ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.108* (0.011) 1991, 2000, 2006 9.744* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 2.557 
Estonia ARDL(3, 0, 0, 2) -0.501* (0.085) 1994, 1998, 2002 1.392 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.393 
Finland ARDL(2, 2, 0, 0) -0.171* (0.031) 1995 3.962*** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.265 
France ARDL(1, 2, 0, 1) -0.274* (0.03) 2008 12.434* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.194 
Germany ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.04* (0.01) 1994, 2000 4.608** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.147 
Greece ARDL(1, 0, 0, 4) -0.468* (0.063) 2008 9.413* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.187 
Hungary ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.416* (0.063) 1989 5.748* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.598 
Ireland ARDL(1, 3, 0, 0) -0.44* (0.062) 1995 8.968* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.721 
Italy ARDL(4, 2, 4, 0) -0.328* (0.07) 1989, 1996 3.286*** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 2.369 
Latvia ARDL(3, 2, 2) -0.995* (0.109) 1998, 2004 8.51* 3.38 4.02 3.88 4.61 4.99 5.85 2.702 
Lithuania ARDL(1, 0, 0, 2) -0.357* (0.051) 2002 3.916** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.120 
Luxembourg ARDL(2, 3, 3, 0) -0.534* (0.103) - 4.444** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.582 
Malta ARDL(3, 0, 1, 1) -0.511* (0.045) 2001, 2008 10.118* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 2.966*** 
Netherlands ARDL(3, 4, 1, 4) -0.132* (0.024) 1985, 1988, 1996, 2006 0.412 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.170 
Poland ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.808* (0.239) 2002 4.102*** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.238 
Portugal ARDL(1, 2, 0, 3) -0.083* (0.011) 2000 7.506* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.223 
Romania ARDL(2, 2, 0, 1) -0.447* (0.045) 1996, 2008 6.719* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 2.572 
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Slovakia ARDL(1, 0, 0, 1) -0.974* (0.24) 1997, 200, 2004 1.911 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.405 
Slovenia ARDL(1, 0, 0, 2) -0.781* (0.151) 2000 3.239*** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.835 
Spain ARDL(3, 3, 0, 0) -0.082* (0.015) 1989 6.389* 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 0.040 
Sweden ARDL(3, 3, 4, 3) -0.136* (0.017) 1988, 1993, 2002, 2007 9.669* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.725 
United Kingdom ARDL(1, 3, 4, 2) -0.299* (0.051) 1999, 2006 5.891* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.141 
Note: lg is log of gasoline consumption per driver, lpg is log of real price of gasoline, lgdp is log of real GDP per capita, lvt is log of number of vehicles per 
driver. (lg lpg lgdp lvt) indicates the order of the variables lag in the selected model. *, ** and *** denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test of up to 1 lag 
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Table 10: Diesel demand estimation 
Country 
Selected Model 
(ld lpd lgdp lvt) 
Cointegrating 
coefficient Break Years 
Bounds test 
LM(1) 
Test statistic 
value 
Critical value bounds 
10% 5% 1% 
F-statistic I0 I1 I0 I1 I0 I1 
Austria ARDL(2, 3, 3, 0) -0.277* (0.049) 1996 3.546*** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.130 
Belgium ARDL(3, 2, 1, 1) -0.797* (0.109) 1988, 1996, 2008 10.692* 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 0.637 
Bulgaria ARDL(2, 0, 2, 1) -0.88* (0.239) 1997, 2009 5.664* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.299 
Croatia ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.401** (0.131) 1998, 2003, 2010 2.877         2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.823 
Cyprus ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.267* (0.092) 1995 2.497 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 1.855 
Czech Republic ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.076* (0.015) 2005 4.223** 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 1.865 
Denmark ARDL(2, 5, 5, 5) -0.276** (0.071) 1988 1.451 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.001 
Estonia ARDL(5, 0, 0, 0) -0.755** (0.21) 1996, 2001, 2010 0.433 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.168 
Finland ARDL(1, 2, 3, 2) -0.605* (0.099) 1994 7.116* 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 0.739 
France ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.315* (0.059) 1997, 2002, 2007 5.539* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.032 
Germany ARDL(1, 0, 0, 1) -0.534* (0.075) 1989, 1999, 2008 6.478* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.366 
Greece ARDL(1, 2, 0, 0) -0.835* (0.175) 2003 4.141** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.358 
Hungary ARDL(2, 2, 2, 2) -0.226* (0.02) 1991, 1998, 2005, 2009 12.473* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 2.575 
Ireland ARDL(4, 0, 2, 0) -0.643* (0.135) 2009 2.768 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 2.433 
Italy ARDL(4, 4, 4, 5) -0.446* (0.033) 1993, 2007 29.327* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 2.393 
Latvia ARDL(5, 0, 0, 0) -0.914* (0.207) 1998, 1999, 2004 3.833** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 1.426 
Lithuania ARDL(3, 1, 0, 0) -0.663* (0.12) 1998, 2000, 2009 21.492* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.018 
Luxembourg ARDL(1, 3, 0, 4) -0.429* (0.062) 1994, 1991 4.759** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.907 
Malta ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.67 (0.677) 2002,  2005,  2009 1.797 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.001 
Netherlands ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0) -0.278* (0.078) 1983 3.640*** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.469 
Poland ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0) -0.357** (0.138) 2000 0.633 2.01 3.1 2.45 3.63 3.42 4.84 0.249 
Portugal ARDL(1, 1, 2, 2) -0.199* (0.041) 1996, 2008 4.310** 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 1.473 
Romania ARDL(1, 2, 3, 3) -0.77* (0.168) 1999 1.259 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 7.824* 
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Slovakia ARDL(3, 0, 0, 0) -0.389* (0.109) 2001, 2004, 2009 4.120** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.049 
Slovenia ARDL(2, 2, 0) -0.241** (0.09) 2008, 2009 1.018 2.63 3.35 3.1 3.87 4.13 5 4.986** 
Spain ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4) -0.438* (0.079) 1987, 2002, 2008 4.163** 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.513 
Sweden ARDL(3, 0, 1, 0) -0.532* (0.087) 1983 5.063* 2.37 3.2 2.79 3.67 3.65 4.66 0.707 
United Kingdom ARDL(1, 0, 1, 0) -0.161* (0.03) - 8.569* 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 4.3 5.23 0.984 
Note: ld is log of diesel consumption per driver, lpd is log of real price of diesel, lgdp is log of real GDP per capita, lvt is log of number of vehicles per driver. 
(ld lpd lgdp lvt) indicates the order of the variables lag in the selected model. *, ** and *** denote significance at 1 %, 5 % and 1 0% respectively. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test of up to 1 lag
9.2. Stability test of estimated model
9.2.1. Gasoline demand CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots
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9.2.2. Diesel demand CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots
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